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The Paradox of Family Privacy
David D. Meyer

53 Vand. L. Rev. 527 (2000)

For seventy-five years, the Supreme Court's protection of the
constitutional rights of family privacy has had two sides. On the outside is a veneer of often absolutist rhetoric exalting the "sanctityof the
family" and sketching the boundaries of a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter." On the inside is an essentially pragmatic approachto deciding actual controversies involving the family.
In this Article, Professor Meyer contends that the Court has
been right to moderate its scrutiny because the rigidity of traditional
fundamental-rights analysis is ill-suited to the task of mediating the
complex and intersectingprivate and communal interests which are
often at stake in the family. He argues, however, that the Court has
been wrong to resist acknowledging this reality. Besides generating
confusion, the Court's refusal to come clean about the qualified nature
of family-privacy rights paradoxically has undermined the values of
autonomy and intimacy that the rights are said to exalt. The Court's
nominal adherence to the traditional strict-scrutiny formula has
pushed it- to construe the scope of family-privacy rights narrowly at the
threshold in order to leave tolerable leeway for state regulation. And
the Court's tendency to justify its narrow construction in terms of the
desert or legitimacy of particular family relationships or decisions
itself has regulatory significance, compounding the extent of the state's
intrusion into family life.
ProfessorMeyer concludes by arguingthat openly embracing the
sort of intermediate review that in fact has characterized much of the
Court's work in this context would place family-privacy rights on a less
exalted, but ultimately more secure plane. And he points to several
criteria embedded in the Court's past cases that would help provide
greater determinacy to a constitutional "reasonableness"standard for
state action directed at the family.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the nature of the Constitution's protection for
freedom of choice in matters relating to family life, there is wide
agreement on perhaps only two points: first, that the subject raises
"questions of unsurpassed significance in th[e] Court's interpretation
of the Constitution,"' and, second, that the Court's halting passes at
these questions have left its family privacy doctrine in a state of unsurpassed disarray. The significance of the questions is transparent.
A comprehensive account of the subject calls for answers to the most
basic and intractable problems of judicial review, answers that might
justify the judiciary's role in negating, without textual authority,
majoritarian governance in an area that is of particularly profound
interest not only to the individual but also to the polity.!
Yet answers in this context have been particularly slow in
coming. The Supreme Court has eschewed any effort to develop a
unified theory that might define the special content of family liberty
and justify the extraordinary limitations placed upon state authority
in this area. Instead, the Court has been content to let strands of
doctrine emerge piecemeal. Rights to abortion, contraception, marriage, kinship, and the custody and rearing of children have, for the
most part, sprung up independently of one another, only later converging into a loosely recognized constellation of "family privacy"
rights.
Clarity has been impeded, moreover, not only by the Court's
failure to adopt any cohesive theory that might tie these rights together, but also by its refusal to adhere consistently to any single
standard of constitutional review. At one time or another, the Court
has denominated each of the individual rights comprising family
privacy as "fundamental," suggesting that any significant governmental intrusions upon them should be subject to the narrowest pos-

1. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 547 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2. The Supreme Court long has acknowledged the significance of the state's interest in the
family as the basic unit of socialization and education. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 397, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ('CThe State, representing the collective expression of
moral aspirations, has an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations
reflect the widely held values of its people."); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 50304 (1977) ("It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural."); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15, 45 (1885) ("[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in
the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth ....than that which seeks to establish it on
the basis of the idea of the family,... the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our
civilization. ...
.") (quoted in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651-52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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sible limits. Yet the Court's actual behavior in specific cases has left a
large wake of uncertainty and confusion. In articulating the scope of
its review, the Court has seemed consciously to avoid the familiar
language of strict scrutiny, opting instead to muddy the waters with
ambiguous hedge phrases and arguable synonyms. Even more than in
other areas of unenumerated or fundamental rights, therefore, the
Court's family privacy cases have left pointedly unclear both what
sorts of private conduct are deserving of heightened protection and
what form that protection should take.
Importantly, all the while the Court has followed this middling
course, it has insisted upon maintaining the veneer that it is protecting fundamental rights in a traditional, doctrinally familiar manner.
The result, as the California Supreme Court recently lamented, is a
constitutional doctrine "without any coherent legal definition or
standard."3
In this Article, I argue that there is an important and unfortunate disjunction between what the Court says about family privacy
rights and how it actually goes about protecting those rights in real
cases. In Part I, I review the Court's family-privacy cases and
conclude that, notwithstanding rhetoric consistently exalting the
fundamental nature of these rights, the Court in fact has taken a more
meandering course. Above all else, the Court has been pragmatic,
tacitly adjusting its scrutiny in light of the magnitude of the state's
intrusion and the strength of the state's regulatory interests. Only in
the context of abortion, however, has the Court now come close to
acknowledging openly the more limited nature of its review.
In Part II, I consider the consequences of this disjunction.
Specifically, I argue that the Court's illusory adherence to the fundamental-rights framework, while in fact applying a more flexible standard of review, has worked significant perversions in the
constitutional doctrine. Shifting conceptions of the locus of family
privacy rights-from the family as an entity to particular individuals
residing within the family-have coincided with expanded notions of
state action to produce a troubling paradox: a constitutional doctrine
meant to limit state intrusion into the family has been converted into
an invitation for intervention of a particular kind, as courts increasingly have permitted the "fundamental rights" of certain family members to mandate the outcome of intra-family disputes. Having taken
too seriously the Supreme Court's fundamental-rights rhetoric, some
state and lower federal courts have held that the Constitution

3.

Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 651 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).

530

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:527

requires, for example, that a child submit to visitation with an incarcerated or abusive parent' or that custody be awarded to an absent
biological parent rather than a step-parent or guardian who may have
raised a child for years.5
Of equal significance, the Court's nominal adherence to an
analytical framework requiring strict scrutiny has put pressure on the
Court to construe narrowly the scope of family privacy rights at the
threshold. Thus, in cases in which a particular governmental regulation seems intuitively to be constitutionally tolerable and yet does not
readily seem to satisfy the exacting demands of strict scrutiny, there
is a recurring temptation to justify the intuition by concluding that
the regulated conduct did not fall within the protected right in the
first place. Such reasoning then finds expression in judicial holdings
that the regulated family activity or relationship is without privileged
constitutional status because it lacks "traditional respect in our society"6 and thus is not really "deserving of constitutional recognition."7
This leads to a second irony: a doctrine meant to exalt non-interference in family life itself serves as an engine of state regulation, as
the expressive power of constitutional law is wielded by the judiciary
to honor and entrench certain personal choices in family matters and
to condemn and delegitimize others.
Thus, in Part III, I argue that it would be a wiser course for the
Court to come clean about the true nature of family privacy rights-to
acknowledge openly that governmental intrusions upon these rights
are sustained not only when necessary to the attainment of the most
exceptional public goals, but whenever they are judged ultimately to
be reasonable. In this regard, I suggest a surprisingly novel linkage
between the implicit privacy protections of the Fourteenth Amend-

4.
See, e.g., In re J.A., 962 P.2d 173, 184 (Alaska 1998) (Matthews, C.J., dissenting)
(stating that, absent clear and convincing proof of unfitness or misconduct endangering the child,
a parent is constitutionally entitled to maintain some contact, even over the objections of the
custodial parent); Hoversten v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 200-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(acknowledging the constitutional visitation rights of incarcerated parent); In re Julie M., 81 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 354, 358-59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that an abusive parent's constitutional right to
visitation precludes giving child a veto right over contact); In re A.C., 643 So. 2d 743, 745 (La.
1994) (holding that clear and convincing proof of sexual abuse is required in order to prohibit
visitation rights); Mullin v. Phelps, 647 A.2d 714, 724 (Vt. 1994) (same).
5.
See, e.g., S.G.v. C.S.G., 726 So. 2d 806, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re M.M.L., 900
P.2d 813, 819-23 (Kan. 1995); Grant v. Martin, 744 So. 2d 817, 820-21 (Miss. App. 1999); Girard
v. Williams, 966 P.2d 1155, 1162-66 (Mont. 1998). In Girard,for example, the court held that a
father who was unknown to his two school-age sons was "entitled" to claim custody of them from
their longtime guardians upon his release from prison, notwithstanding the "trauma" the boys
admittedly would suffer. See Girard,966 P.2d. at 1166-67.
6.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
7.
Moore, 431 U.S. at 504 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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ment and the explicit privacy protections of the Fourth, and call for a
rough harmonization, on a consistent "reasonableness" standard, of
the Constitution's protections for family and personal privacy. Such a
standard would not, I contend, introduce significant (or ultimately
intolerable) indeterminacy into the Constitution's protection of family
privacy. Indeed, the Court's doctrine could be made appreciably more
predictable by reorienting it around a structured approach to reasonableness, and I begin to identify several of the pillars that tacitly have
structured the Court's inquiry in past cases. Although my proposal
would require the softening of some judicial rhetoric about the
sanctity of family privacy, I conclude that the benefits of a more comprehensible and flexible regime of constitutional limitations would
outweigh whatever would be lost in the expressive value of the Court's
exaggerated rhetoric.
I. THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF FAMILY PRiVACY
Beyond the spirited and deep-going debate over the theoretical
justifications for the judiciary's identification and enforcement of
unenumerated constitutional rights, there is broad agreement that the
Supreme Court's "privacy" cases have created a doctrinal "quagmire."8
Nowhere is this more true than in that branch of constitutional privacy cases dealing with matters of intimacy and autonomy in family
life.' More than seventy-five years after the Supreme Court first
began to carve out "a 'private realm of family life which the state

8.
See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Tribe's JudiciousFeminism, 44 STAN. L. REV. 179, 192 (1991)
(book review) (describing "the 'substantive due process' quagmire of the privacy-as-fundamentalliberty argument"); Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, 10 CONST. COMMENTARY 510, 510 (1993)
(noting that "prominent scholars have tried to escape the swamp by abandoning the concept of
privacy altogether); see also Hill, 865 P.2d at 650-51.
9.
The Court's constitutional privacy cases under the Fourteenth Amendment generally
are grouped into two branches, one dealing with autonomy in making "a person's most basic
decisions about family and parenthood," Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992),
and the other recognizing an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure [by the government] of
personal matters," Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). A third branch of constitutional
privacy doctrine is rooted in the Fourth Amendment's guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures. See infra Part IH.A.
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cannot enter,""..' the boundaries of that constitutional sanctuary
remain decidedly unclear.11
The confusion stems primarily from two sources: first, the
fragmented nature of the Court's family privacy doctrine, and, second,
the Court's failure to identify and adhere consistently to a single standard of constitutional review.
A. An Amalgam of Rights
Current constitutional protection for family privacy is comprised of various distinct, though related, strands of rights against the
state. It includes the right to marry,2 to procreate or to avoid procreation,13 to rear children," and to cohabit with family members."5 Although the Court occasionally groups these rights together in describing a more all-encompassing right of family privacy, 6 it has never
seriously attempted to offer a comprehensive theory which might
explain why some intimate conduct or relationships, but not others,
are entitled to special constitutional solicitude. Thus, the Court's past
willingness to recognize a fundamental right to marry" or to expose

10. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977) (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166). The
origins of constitutional rights of family privacy generally are traced to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in which the Court
recognized a right of parents to direct the education of their children. See infra text
accompanying notes 20-35.
11. As one district judge summed up the current doctrine, "[w]hile it is beyond dispute that
family privacy and association are constitutionally protected rights, the circumstances in which
those rights would be violated remain murky." Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 833 (D. Kan.
1992), affd, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993); accord, e.g., McKenna v. Fargo, 451 F. Supp. 1355,
1379 (D.N.J. 1978) (acknowledging "[t]he confused state of the constitutional doctrine of
privacy'), aff'd, 601 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1979); Hill, 865 P.2d at 651 (describing "the murky
character of federal constitutional privacy analysis).
12. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-85
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)
(same); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (avoid sterilization).
14. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Piere,268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer,
262 U.S. at 399.
15. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-506 (1977).
16. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997); Casey, 505 U.S. at 84849; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446 (1990) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); Moore, 431
U.S. at 500-01. The Court, however, has not always been so sure. In 1976, the Court frankly
admitted it was uncertain whether "tihe Meyer-Pierce-Yoder 'parental' right and the privacy
right' emerging from cases such as Griswold and Roe were theoretically distinct or were merely
"verbal variations of a single constitutional right." Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 n.15
(1976).
17. See supra note 12.
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one's children to foreign-language instruction1 8 cannot safely be relied
upon to predict whether there is similar constitutional protection for,
say, an individual's choice to cohabit with a lover or to employ harsh
corporal punishment in child-rearing. This is because despite the oftrepeated insistence that its substantive-due-process "holdings... are
'not a series of isolated points,' but mark a 'rational continuum'" of
heightened protection,19 the Court has yet to agree on the rationale
that explains its rather tattered family-privacy "continuum."
The improvisational nature of the Court's family privacy jurisprudence is reflected clearly in its origins. In Meyer v. Nebraska' and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters"--now regarded as the foundational family
privacy cases-the Court struck down state efforts to regulate primary
education, holding that government could not prevent children from
learning a foreign language' or from attending a private school.' In
neither case, however, did the Court ground its holding squarely and
unambiguously in the Constitution's special regard for the family.
Rather, the Court seemed to be moved by a combination of several
distinct constitutional concerns. In striking down the ban on foreignlanguage instruction in Meyer, for instance, the Court relied heavily
not only upon the right of parents to manage the education of their
children, but also upon the right of the petitioner-who was, after all,
not a parent but a teacher-to pursue his calling. 4 So, too, in Pierce
the Court alternated between a concern for "the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children!' and the
"property" and "liberty" interests of private educators to "engage[ ] in
a kind of undertaking not inherently harmful."' Accordingly, in describing the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause, the Court
catalogued the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" directly alongside "the right of the individual to contract[ ] [and]
to engage in any of the common occupations of life."' At times, the
Court seemed to say that the core constitutional problem with the
laws in these two cases was their interference with the parent-child

18. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
19. Casey, 505 U.S. at 858 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
20. Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
21. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
22. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
23. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
24. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. The Court in Meyer thus summed up its opinion with the
conclusion that the ban on instruction offended the Constitution by "aboli[shing]" an apparently
harmless "occupation." Id. at 403.
25. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
26. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
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relationship, the state's attempt in each instance to "standardize...
children"27 and to usurp authority over child-rearing that age-old
societal consensus had assigned to parents. 8 Elsewhere, however, the
Court seemed predominantly offended by the law's intermeddling in
the free contractual exchange between parent and educator' or by the
state's naked attempt to suppress the "acquisition of knowledge,"' all
quite independent of the happenstance that the cases involved children and their parents.
Indeed, the Court's easy blending of rationales in Meyer and
Pierce gives the cases something like the quality of a prism in modern
constitutional law, refracting the light of several different theories of
individual rights and creating varying images depending upon the
angle at which one views them. Thus, 40 years after deciding Meyer
and Pierce,the Court could look back on them as resting directly upon
the First Amendment principle that "the State may not.., contract
the spectrum of available knowledge."3 ' Elsewhere, the Court has
explained the cases as protecting. chiefly the rights of religious or
ethnic minorities, implying strongly that the vice of the laws was not
their interference with a fundamental right to rear children or receive
information, but their discrimination against a suspect class.32 From
still another angle, the cases can be seen as simply of a piece with the
Court's Lochner-era3 romance with laissez-faire economics, vindicating the contractual liberty of teachers to pursue their calling' or
the quasi-property rights of parents in their children.35

27. Pierce,268 U.S. at 535.
28. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02.
29. See id. at 400 ('Plaintiff in error taught [the German] language in school as part of his
occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their
children, we think, are within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.").
30. Id.; see also id. at 399 (listing the right "to acquire useful knowledge" as an aspect of
constitutionally protected "liberty," alongside the right "to contract" and the right of parents to
"bring up children").
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see also 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.7, at 634
n.32 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that Meyer and Pierce "might be viewed as relating to certain First
Amendment rights").
32. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (describing Meyer and
Pierce as having involved "statutes directed at particular religious... or national.., minorities")
(citations omitted).
33. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 515-16 & n.7 (Black, J., dissenting).
35. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?" Meyer and Pierce
and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (arguing that Meyer and
Pierce "were animated... by... a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a classstratified society, and to a parent's private property rights in his children and their labor").
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In recent years, the Court has settled firmly on the view that
Meyer and Pierce recognized a "fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child[ren]."'
And so today, long after the substantive economic due process theory
of the Lochner era has dropped away into the recesses of constitutional history, Meyer and Pierce continue to provide support for a
thriving amalgam of substantive due process rights of family privacy
and autonomy. Yet the hodge-podge character of the theoretical basis
for the Court's original holdings in Meyer and Pierce reveals just how
weak the ground is underneath this structure of rights.
Having launched its family-privacy jurisprudence with only the
dimmest view of its theoretical justifications or limits, the Court has
been scarcely more successful in subsequent years in rallying any
consensus on the matter. For the past 30 years, the Court has seesawed between expansive interest-balancing and narrower historybased justifications for the Court's protection of family privacy. When
in an expansive mood, the Court has embraced the idea that the underlying theory of the family-privacy cases is the Constitution's special
regard for self-governance in matters of exceptional intimacy, recognizing "'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."', The touchstone of privacy protection under this
view is the degree to which an individual would resent state intrusion;
where the stakes of intervention for the individual are exceptionally
high-say, having to incur or continue an unwanted pregnancy-the
Constitution demands an exceptional justification from the state."
Just as often, however, the Court has retreated from the broad
implications of the intimate-decisions rationale, insisting instead that
the boundaries of the Constitution's solicitude for family privacy are
marked by historical consensus about the proper limits of governmental power.39 What makes a family relationship or personal

36. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 859 (1992) (quoting Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S 678, 684-85 (1977)).
38. This was the Court's method of analysis in, for example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). As has often been observed, what justified recognition of the fundamental right for the
Court in that case was appreciation of the large "detriment that the State would impose upon the
pregnant woman by denying th[e] choice [to terminate her pregnancy]," a detriment potentially
encompassing medical risk, physical hardship, psychological harm, and "a distressful life and
future." Id. at 153. This method also prevailed a year earlier in Eisenstadtv. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972), when the Court recognized a fundamental right of unmarried persons to obtain and use
contraceptives on the ground that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 453.
39. As the Court stated in 1997, "[tjhat many of the rights and liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that
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decision worthy of heightened constitutional protection under this
view is not the particular stakes for the individual, but whether
society traditionally has regarded the particular relationship or choice
as off-limits to governmental interference. Thus, in a number of cases
where there could be no doubt that there were very large personal
stakes for individuals affected by governmental intervention, the
Court nevertheless refused to find a fundamental right on the ground
that the individual's particular choices concerning intimacy or family
life were not historically sanctioned."
The absence of a single, coherent theory justifying the Court's
intervention continues to dog the Court across the broad spectrum of
its modern family privacy cases, making it difficult to predict when
the Court will be willing to recognize a given family relationship or
activity as constitutionally privileged.
B. Ambivalence andAmbiguity in the Court'sReview
The Court has generated confusion on a second front as well.
Even when it is possible to say with confidence that the state has
intruded upon a protected family right, it is impossible to know with
any certainty how aggressive the Court will be in policing the intrusion.
At one time or another, the Court has identified each of the
specific rights comprising family privacy as "fundamental."4 ' Traditional due process and equal protection doctrine, of course, provides

any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected." Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997). Instead, the Glucksberg Court insisted that the "crucial
'guideposts'" for identifying the scope of fundamental rights are "[o]ur Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices." Id. at 721 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,
125 (1992)); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) ("Ihe
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.).
40. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court found no
fundamental right implicated although the state action there-laws prohibiting homosexual
conduct as sodomy-threatened to deprive the individual of means of intimate sexual expression.
See id. at 191-95. Likewise, in Michael H. v. GeraldD., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the Court found no
fundamental right although the stakes of the governmental action included the extinguishment
of a biological father's established relationship with his daughter and his complete exclusion
from her life. See id. at 125-27.
41. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) ("[T]he decision to marry is a
fundamental right.... '); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (noting that the Court's cases recognize "a
fundamental individual right to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child'); Santosky, 455
U.S. at 753 (discussing "[tlhe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child[ren]'j); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978)
(same); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977) (noting that the "right of
decision in matters of childbearing" is "constitutionally protected).
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that any state action that significantly impinges upon a fundamental
right must be subjected to strict scrutiny, requiring the state to prove
that its interference with the right is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.42 Yet the Court's family-privacy cases leave
considerable doubt about whether strict scrutiny is in fact the governing constitutional test. Both the Court's description of the applicable standard of review and its own conduct of review in particular
cases strongly suggest that the Court in fact applies a less stringent
form of review.
1. Abortion
The governing standard in the abortion cases has been famously slippery. Although the Court first described the right to abortion as "fundamental" in Roe v. Wade,4 consensus on the point was
short-lived. Indeed, by 1989, a plurality of the Court thought it unnecessary to explore "the abstract differences between a 'fundamental
right' to abortion..., a 'limited fundamental constitutional right,'...
or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."" Whatever
the proper classification, the Court by then was largely settled in a
mode of constitutional review that bore little resemblance to traditional strict scrutiny. Writing in 1990, two years before the Court
reformulated the abortion right in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,"' Professors Daniel Farber and John
Nowak surveyed the Court's evolving abortion doctrine and concluded
that the Court in the 1980s had abandoned any pretense of strict
scrutiny."8 "Whatever Roe v. Wade originally may have meant in
Justice Blackmun's mind," they wrote, "it now encompasses a much
more flexible approach to abortion. The touchstone of this new approach is reasonableness.""7 In reviewing laws controlling the configu-

42. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAx, supra note 31, § 15.7; 3 id., § 18.3 (discussing fundamental
rights and standards of review under the Equal Protection Clause).
43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). The Court stuck to the same formulation in
Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89, and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
(Akron ), 462 U.S. 416, 420 n.1 (1983).
44. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
plurality opinion).
45. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
46. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial Experience with
the 1980's "Reasonableness"Test, 76 VA. L. REV. 519, 523 (1990) ("By 1986, it was quite literally
'black letter' or 'hornbook' law that in pre-viability abortions Roe requires strict scrutiny only to
determine if the regulation in question is a reasonable health regulation.") (citing JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 698 (3d ed. 1986)).
47. Id. at 520.
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ration or duties of medical personnel relating to abortion,48 for example, or requiring parental notification or consent when a minor elects
abortion,49 the Court upheld or struck down the particular requirements based upon whether they seemed to be reasonable and measured means of protecting health or promoting responsible decisionmaking.' The Court did not, however, hew to any recognizable form of
strict scrutiny.
The Court's 1992 embrace of the "undue burden!' standard in
Casey thus did not represent so much a dramatic overhaul of the right
to abortion as the denouement of a long and gradual repudiation of
traditional fundamental-rights analysis. Casey made it clear that,
under the "undue burden" standard, the constitutionality of abortion
regulations would turn more frankly on the Court's assessment of
their "reasonableness": "States are free," the plurality wrote in crystallizing the constitutional rule, "to enact laws to provide a reasonable
framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound
and lasting meaning."5' And it also made clear that this standard of

48. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 759-65 (1986) (striking down requirement that physicians inform patients considering
abortion of particular medical risks); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482-86
(1983) (upholding requirement that second physician be present during certain abortions); Akron
1, 462 U.S. at 442-49 (striking down requirement that physicians orally provide specified medical
information to patients considering abortion); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975) (per
curiam) (upholding requirement that abortion be performed by a licensed physician).
49. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502, 510-17 (1990)
(upholding statutory requirement of notice to one parent with possibility of judicial bypass);
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450-55 (1990) (striking down statutory requirement that
both parents of a minor be notified); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407-13 (1981) (upholding
requirement of parental notification as applied to immature, unemancipated, and dependent
minors); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644-56 (1979) (striking down statute that required even
mature minors to notify their parents and to obtain parental or judicial consent).
50. See Farber & Nowak, supra note 46, at 522-24.
51. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, J.J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The plurality in Casey went on to define an
"undue burden" as "shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus." Id. at 877. In applying that standard to the particular statutory restrictions at issue in
Casey, the plurality made clear that the test ultimately turns on an assessment of whether the
particular regulation is a "reasonable" accommodation between the individual's interest in
autonomous decisionmaking and the state's interests in deliberative decisionmaking or
preservation of life or health.
See id. at 883 (upholding constitutionality of statutory
requirement that "the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal
development' on the ground that it is "a reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice")
(emphasis added); id. at 885 (upholding constitutionality of statutory requirement that a licensed
physician, as opposed to a qualified assistant, provide certain information to a woman "as a
reasonablemeans to ensure that the woman's consent is informed") (emphasis added); cf. id. at
895 (stating that parental notification requirements are valid "based on the quite reasonable
assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents") (emphasis added);
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review is distinctly more deferential than traditional strict scrutiny. 2
But the ease with which the Court could draw support for its "undue
burden" test from its earlier abortion precedents demonstrated the
accuracy of Farber and Nowak's thesis that the Court had abandoned
traditional fundamental-rights analysis well before 1992.'
2. Marriage
In contrast to its ongoing discord in the abortion cases, the
Court has not hesitated in recognizing the right to marry as fundamental. ' As in the abortion cases, however, the Court has demonstrated far less certainty about just what that recognition should
mean in any given case. Although the Court's denomination of the
right as fundamental would seem to require strict scrutiny for any

Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 119, 133-36 (1989) (construing Justice O'Connor's "undue burden" test, before
Casey, to turn largely on "the quantity of burden an abortion restriction imposes"); Gillian E.
Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional
Jurisprudence,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2031 (1994).
52. The difference between traditional strict scrutiny and the more deferential "undue
burden" test is well exemplified by the Casey Court's analysis of a requirement in the
Pennsylvania statute that certain information about the health risks of abortion be provided to
women by a licensed physician, as opposed to a qualified assistant. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884-85
(O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.J., plurality opinion). Such a requirement readily fails
traditional strict scrutiny because there is no demonstration of the necessity that the information
be provided by a medical doctor. Cf. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 448 (rejecting the contention that "the
woman's consent to the abortion will not be informed if a physician delegates the counseling task
to another qualified individual'). Applying the "undue burden" test, however, the plurality in
Casey found no need to consider the necessity of the requirement, and instead emphasized a
measure of deference to state policy judgments that is quite alien to strict scrutiny.
Since there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the information as
provided by the statute would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a
woman seeking an abortion, we conclude that it is not an undue burden. Our cases
reflect the fact that the Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that
particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective
assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by others. See
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Thus, we uphold the
provision as a reasonablemeans to ensure that the woman's consent is informed.
Id. at 884-85 (emphasis added).
The Court's reliance on Williamson, a case normally cited for its classic statement of the
rationality standard of review, in assessing the permissibility of Pennsylvania's abortion
regulation reflects how far from strict scrutiny the Court has strayed.
53. In Casey, the plurality was able to collect a handful of earlier cases that had employed
"undue burden" language in analyzing the constitutionality of abortion restrictions, see Casey,
505 U.S. at 874-75 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, J.J., plurality opinion), and to point to still
other cases that in fact applied some form of "reasonableness" review less than strict scrutiny,
see id. at 885 (quoting Akron I's analysis of whether "the State's legitimate concern that the
woman's decision be informed is reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay') (emphasis
added).
54. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 38384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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significant governmental impairment of an individual's freedom to
enter into (or, presumably, exit) marriage,' the Court's cases dealing
with marriage regulation are in fact more equivocal.
Two of the cases most often cited for recognizing the fundamental nature of the right to marriage, Loving v. Virginia' and Turner v.
Safley,57 are of little help because the standard of review in each case
was controlled by an independent factor. Loving applied strict
scrutiny to Virginia's anti-miscegenation law, but it would have done
so in any event because the law involved a suspect racial
classification." Turner applied a more deferential standard of review
to a law restricting the ability of prison inmates to marry, but its
deference was driven largely by the fact that the regulations applied
in a prison setting.' Thus, neither case squarely addresses which
standard of review should apply to state restrictions on marriage in
ordinary circumstances.
The Court confronted that question directly in Zablocki v. Redhail,')but seemed to hedge its answer. Considering a challenge to a
Wisconsin law that required court permission before parents subject to
a child-support order could marry, the Court stated that "reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter
into the marital relationship" will be presumed constitutional, subject
only to minimal rational-basis review.61 Regulations that do "significantly interfere" with a person's decision to marry, the Court contin-

55. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 31, § 18.28, at 575 (concluding that "laws which
restrict individual choice regarding marriage or divorce will be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' under
the due process or equal protection clauses").
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
58. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. The Court noted that the law was also defective because it
burdened the fundamental right of marriage, but did not specify whether strict scrutiny would be
independently triggered for that reason as well. See id. at 11-12; see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at
398 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) ("Loving involved a denial of a 'fundamental freedom' on
a wholly unsupportable basis-the use of classifications 'directly subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment... ! It does not speak to the level of judicial
scrutiny of, or governmental justification for, 'supportable' restrictions on the 'fundamental
freedom' of individuals to marry or divorce.").
59. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 85. The Court framed the test as whether the restrictions on
marriage were "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. at 89. The Court has
applied the same deferential standard of review in considering claims that prison regulations
abridged other fundamental rights as well. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414-19
(1989) (upholding regulation authorizing wardens to restrict inmates' receipt of certain types of
publications); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987) (upholding regulation
that impeded inmates' exercise of religion).
60. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61. Id. at 386.
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ued, are subject to a level of scrutiny described as "rigorous,"6 under
which the regulation must be "closely tailored" to achieve a "sufficiently important' state interest.' By these words, perhaps the Court
meant to describe traditional strict scrutiny. But its deviation from
the familiar language of prior opinions and substitution of debatable
synonyms seemed calculated to leave the question open.'
The majority's application of the test to the Wisconsin statute
did nothing to resolve the ambiguity. The Court obligingly assumed
that the State's goals in enacting the statute-primarily prodding
parents to meet their child-support obligations-were "legitimate and
substantial,"' but held that the statute was an "unnecessarily" clumsy
means of advancing those goals.' The Court's focus on the under- and
over-inclusiveness of the statute (for example, its pointless6 7 or
"irrational"' denial of marriage to truly indigent parents who were
incapable of responding to the statute's intended incentives) could be
understood as an application of strict scrutiny's "narrow tailoring"
test, but is equally consistent with the sort of "fit!' analysis used under
more middling standards of review.69
The separate opinions of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
each of whom concurred in the judgment, seem only to confirm that
the Court was embracing something less than true strict scrutiny for
marriage restrictions. Each expressed the view that not all laws "significantly" or "substantially" restricting an individual's freedom to

62. Id.
63. Id. at 388.
64. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 31, § 18.28, at 581 (noting that "[t]he majority

opinion [in Zablocki] left the exact nature of the standard of review employed in this case
unclear," and concluding that the Court's "statements indicate that the Court used a standard of
review that approximates one or more of the 'middle level standard[s] of review'"); Carl E.
Schneider, State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy"Law: An Essay on the
Constitutionalizationof Social Issues, 51 J. LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1988) (reaching the

same conclusion); Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the ConstitutionalRight to Marry,
1790-1990, 41 HOW. L.J. 289, 324-25 (1998) (same).
65. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. Again, the Court seemed consciously to avoid consideration of

whether this aim was "compelling,"the benchmark under traditional strict scrutiny.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 389 (emphasizing that "with respect to individuals who are unable to meet the
statutory requirements, the statute merely prevents the applicant from getting married, without
delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant's prior children").
68. Id. at 394 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).
69. Compare, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976) (analyzing whether genderbased classification "closely serves" state's "important" objectives under intermediate scrutiny).
Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court requires the government to demonstrate that its means
are "substantially related" to the achievement of an "important" state purpose. See generally 3
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supranote 31, § 18.3, at 218-21 (describing intermediate scrutiny).
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enter into marriage should be subject to strict scrutiny." Specifically,
each supposed that laws barring bigamous, incestuous, or under-age
marriages would be sustained without any requirement that the government demonstrate an exceptional justification.7'
For these
Justices, what ultimately doomed the Wisconsin statute was not that
it "significantly interfere[d]" with the choice to marry, or that it did so
without proof that there was no less burdensome way of achieving a
compelling public goal, but simply that it restricted access to marriage
in an unreasonable way."
What made the statute's lack of fit
intolerable was its palpable unfairness, its imposition of a draconian
3 penalty and
and "unprecedented""
its "deliberate discrimination
against the poor,"" an economic class that already had more than its
share of hardships. The statute's defect was ultimately not its
imprecision, but its embodiment of a legislative policy7'5judgment that
was simply "alen... to our shared notions of fairness."
Taken together, the various opinions in Zablocki reflect a more
flexible and textured review of marriage regulations than ordinarily
associated with strict scrutiny. Zablocki left intact Loving's declaration that marriage is a fundamental right but plainly contemplated
that incursions on the right would be policed pragmatically. The level
of judicial scrutiny will vary not only with the substantiality of the
state's restriction of the freedom to marry, but also with the particular
nature of the restriction. 8
Moreover, the sufficiency of the
justification offered by the state will turn not only on whether less
burdensome alternative means exist, but also on the Court's judgment
of whether the chosen means are fair and reasonable in light of all of
the competing public and private values.

70. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392-93 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 396-97,
399 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
71. See id. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment); id. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
72. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 31, § 18.28, at 582 (construing Justice Powell's
and Justice Stewart's opinions as ultimately resting on an assessment "that the law was not a
reasonable means of furthering important state interests).
73. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 403 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 404 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
74. Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 394 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in judgment); id. at 402-03 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
75. Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment).
76. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (supposing lesser scrutiny of traditional
restrictions, such as anti-bigamy and -incest laws).
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3. Kinship
The Court has been equally ambiguous in its cases considering
the Constitution's protection for family choices in living arrangements.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, a plurality held that the fundamental right of family privacy encompassed a right of persons related
by blood, adoption, or marriage to live together as a family.77 Three
years before, the Court had sustained, under the rational-basis test, a
local ordinance from New York that had restricted residence in a
zoned area to single "families" composed of legally or biologically
related members.' In Moore, however, a city had attempted to limit
residence to "families" defined in narrower terms that would have
prevented the petitioner, Inez Moore, from living with both of two
grandsons who had different parents.79 The plurality concluded that
the East Cleveland ordinance, unlike the earlier New York ordinance,
intruded upon the "'private realm of family life,"' and so was subject
to heightened constitutional scrutiny.' As in Zablocki, however, the
plurality described that level of scrutiny in a way that pointedly
seemed to avoid the usual language of strict scrutiny. "[W]hen the
government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements," the plurality stated, "this Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to
which they are served by the challenged regulation."8' The plurality
went no further in describing just how "important" the state's interest
must be or the particular efficiency with which the state's means must
serve its ends.
Applying the test, the plurality, also as in Zablocki, assumed
the "legitima[cy]" of the city's interests in reducing residential congestion and the cost of city services," but concluded that the zoning ordinance served those goals only "marginally, at best."' That the plurality found only the barest and most "tenuous relation" between the
ordinance's definition of "family" and the city's stated goals estab-

77. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-500 (1977).
78. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974).
79. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 496-97.
80. Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
81. Id. As with the Court's description of the standard of review in Zablocki, see supra
notes 61-69 and accompanying text, it is possible to read the plurality as embracing traditional
strict scrutiny, see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on FundamentalRights, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1176, 1178 n.9 (1996) (citing Moore as adopting strict scrutiny). Yet, as with Zablocki, the
plurality's verbal formulation is at least equally consistent with intermediate scrutiny.
82. Moore, 431 U.S. at 500. Once again, as in Zablocki, the plurality did not address
whether these interests also qualified as-or needed to qualify as--"compelling."
83. Id.
84. Id.
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lished that the ordinance would have failed any form of heightened
scrutiny, and this spared the plurality the need to go farther in
fleshing out the precise standard of review.85 The plurality's pointed
ambiguity on the issue, however, is striking and seems to demonstrate
the Court's ambivalence about whether to embrace strict scrutiny
even in cases where it finds the "fundamental" right of family privacy
to be directly and substantially burdened.
4. Child Rearing and Custody
It was in the context of disputes over education and child
rearing that the Court first recognized what later came to be known as
the constitutional right of family privacy.'
These early cases
described the level of judicial scrutiny in modest terms, requiring only
that measures regulating the choices of parents concerning the
education and upbringing of children bear a "reasonable relation" to a
legitimate state purpose.'
But those cases also long predated the
articulation of the modern standards of heightened scrutiny, and so it
is perilous to read too much into the Court's choice of words." It is
evident from the reasoning of the cases that the Court was applying
something appreciably more aggressive than modern-day rationality
review.89 But the early cases remain enigmatic-and not solely
because of the evolving meaning of doctrinal terms.

85. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment for reasons similar to those he cited in his
separate opinion in Zablocki. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. He suggested that
the heightened burden of justification imposed on the government was rooted not in the
ordinance's intrusion into "family life," but rather its interference with the "fundamental" right
of a residential property owner "to decide who may reside on his or her property." Moore, 431
U.S. at 518-20 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). He concluded that the city failed to carry
its burden largely because, as in Zablocki, he was offended by the "unprecedented" and heavyhanded nature of the city's regulatory strategy. See id. at 520-21.
86. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
87. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
88. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 949 (1997); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 & n.5
(1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
89. In Meyer, for example, the Court did not doubt the legitimacy of the state's goal of
'oster[ing] a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current
discussions of civic matters," Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402, or that the ban on foreign-language
instruction rationally furthered that goal. Rather, the Court held that the State's pursuit of that
goal, though rational, must be subordinated to the higher value of parental primacy in making
basic decisions about a child's education. See id. at 402-03. But see Francis Barry McCarthy,
The Confused ConstitutionalStatus and Meaning of ParentalRights, 22 GA. L. REV. 975, 988-89
(1988) (reading Meyer and Pierce as applying "what can be seen through modern eyes as the
present rational basis test").
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In large part, the Court's parental-rights cases remain profoundly murky regarding the balance they strike between private and
communal interests in childrearing because they rest uncomfortably
upon two competing and as-yet-unreconciled metaphors: the family as
a "private refuge!'" from a brutal or indifferent community and the
state as "protector 9 ' of children from a brutal or indifferent family."
As Dean Lee Teitelbaum has pointed out, political and social thought
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries-the milieu from
which the early constitutional cases sprang-simultaneously coupled a
zealous rhetoric of governmental abstention with a strongly
interventionist impulse toward the family. And the Supreme Court
of that era reflected the same tension, vacillating freely-often in the
very same opinion-between grandiose claims of deference to parental
prerogative and confident assertions of state authority to protect child
welfare. 4
Subsequent cases have made it clear that- the Court regards
some form of heightened scrutiny as appropriate whenever the state
intrudes significantly upon a parent's basic decision concerning child
rearing. In recent decades, the Court has stated repeatedly that a
parent has a "fundamental liberty interest" in "'the companionship,

90. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1157; see
also id. at 1141 (discussing the traditional idea of "refuge").
91. Legate v. Legate, 28 S.W. 281, 282 (Tex. 1894).
92. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family: The Parental
Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protectionand Education, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 393, 393 (1996) ("[T]ensions between the public role of parenthood and the privacy of the
family, between public support for responsible parenting and public intervention in irresponsible
parenting, have figured prominently in American politics for at least three quarters of a
century.").
93. See Teitelbaum, supra note 90, at 1157 ("Nineteenth century public concern with childrearing, it seems, was pervasive, however much Americans may have considered the home a
private refuge.").
94. The Court's opinion in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), upholding the
state's authority to prosecute a parent or guardian for enlisting the aid of a child in streetcorner
proselytizing, is a classic illustration. The Court launched its analysis with the oft-repeated
declaration that
[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this that [our] decisions
have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
Id. at 166 (citation omitted). The backsliding, however, commenced with the very next sentence:
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest .... Acting to guard
the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor
and in many other ways.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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care, custody, and management of his or her children."' 95 And yet the
Court in those cases, still torn between the competing metaphors of
family as haven and as hell, stops short of embracing strict scrutiny as
the governing standard.
The Court has used the familiar language of strict scrutiny"compelling" interests and "narrow tailoring"--in only a few of its
cases dealing with the rights of parents. Moreover, in the most prominent of those cases, Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court strongly implied
that strict scrutiny was justified by constitutional interests other than
the child-rearing rights of parents.' In a much greater number of
cases, the Court seems to apply a more free-form "reasonableness" test
to government actions that impede a parent's child-rearing authority,
implicitly calibrating the level of scrutiny in each case to match the
particular degree of intrusion upon the parents' interests. Thus, for
example, the Court has upheld government action subjecting children
to corporal punishment by teachers against the wishes of parents,.8
dismantling a form of private education desired by parents," prohibiting parents or guardians from enlisting the aid of their children in
street-corner proselytizing,"® and requiring the inoculation of children
over the objection of their parents."' Although each of these govern-

95. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)); see also, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447
(1990); Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 579 (1987); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981);
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972).
96. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972). The parents in Yoder objected to
Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law as interfering with both their rights of family
privacy and their First Amendment right to exercise their religion. See id. at 208-09. In
explaining why strict scrutiny applied to the Wisconsin law, the Court expressly referred to the
law's burden on the claimants' Free Exercise rights. See id. at 219. Moreover, the Court pointed
out that the result would be otherwise if the parents were motivated by "secular considerations"
in objecting to sending their children to school, implying that the law's interference with
autonomy in the parents' child-rearing decisions alone would not have been enough to trigger
strict scrutiny. See id. at 216. The Court subsequently has confirmed this view, insisting that
strict scrutiny was justified in Yoder only because it presented a unique combination of Free
Exercise and substantive due process interests. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
881 & n.1 (1990); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 ("[When the interests of parenthood are
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a
'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required to sustain
the validity of the State's requirement underthe FirstAmendment.') (emphasis added).
97. See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the ConstitutionalDilemma of the Faultless
Father,41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 838-42 (1999).
98. See Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907, 907 (1975), affg 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668-71 (1977).
99. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976).
100. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
101. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29-31 (1905).
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mental actions readily could be said to have interfered significantly
with a parent's "companionship, care, or management" of his or her
children, in none of these cases did the Court apply anything resembling strict scrutiny."' Indeed, as Dean Teitelbaum has observed,
when all is said and done, "[w]hat is most striking about [the Court's]
cases... is not the strong language they employ in support of values
of pluralism and deference to parental authority10but
the narrowness of
3
the exceptions they recognize to state authority."
Lower courts, aware that the Court's cases leave plenty of room
for governmental regulation of parents' decisions concerning education, child care, custody arrangements, and other issues of child-rearing, have turned aside parents' objections to mandatory sex education,'
juvenile curfews,0 5 state supervision of "home-school"
curriculum," and community-service obligations for high-school students, ' to name just a few examples, essentially on the grounds that
the State's particular intrusions upon the parent's autonomy in childrearing were "reasonable." Although a handful of cases have applied
strict scrutiny,"° most expressly have not.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's tendency to reduce parent-state
conflicts to a question of "reasonableness" has left a number of lower
federal judges scratching their heads and wondering out loud whether
there really is a "fundamental right" of parents to the "companionship,
care, custody, and management" of their children."° Others have

102. Indeed, despite their apparent meandering, the cases could fairly be read to reveal the
following principle: the Court accords heightened constitutional protection to parental authority
when it happens to agree with the parents' particular child-rearing decisions. See Robert A.
Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 339-40 ('CThis is the thread that
can be traced into a coherent pattern among the votes of the conservative bloc Justices. . . - that
a specific, authoritarian style of parenting rather than the status of parent itself warrants
constitutional deference.").
103. Teitelbaum, supra note 90, at 1157.
104. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 532-34 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996); cf Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 584-87
(Mass. 1995) (upholding condom distribution in public schools).
105. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 545-46 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc);
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1998).
106. See Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988); Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1064 (6th Cir. 1987).
107. See Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174, 177-79 (4th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997); Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461-62
(2d Cir. 1996).
108. See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying strict
scrutiny to juvenile curfew ordinance); Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259, 265 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny to state program to distribute condoms at public high
schools), leave to appeal dismissed, 637 N.E. 2d 279 (N.Y. 1994).
109. The Fourth Circuit, for example, concluded:
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sought to synthesize the case law as recognizing that "parents may
possess a fundamental right [only] against undue... interference by
the state.""' But that, of course, is only another way of saying that the
heightened protection given to parents' child-rearing decisions is
qualified and rests ultimately upon a standard of "reasonableness."
C. Roots of Ambivalence
The full range of the Court's family-privacy jurisprudence thus
reveals a nagging dissonance between the Court's exuberant rhetoric

From Meyer to Runyon, the Supreme Court has stated consistently that parents have a
liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in directing their children's
schooling. Except when the parents' interest includes a religious element [independently
protected by the Free Exercise Clause], the Court has declared with equal consistency
that reasonable regulation by the state is permissible even if it conflicts with that
interest. That is the language of rational basis scrutiny.
Herndon, 89 F.3d at 179; see also Immediato, 73 F.3d at 461; Brown, 68 F.3d at 533 ("MI]he
Meyer and Pierce cases were decided well before the current 'right to privacy' jurisprudence was
developed, and the Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the right to direct the upbringing
and education of one's children is among those fundamental rights whose infringement merits
heightened scrutiny."); McCarthy, supra note 89, at 985 (contending that the Court's "patchwork
of decisions... leave many questions unanswered," including "whether parental rights are truly
fundamental rights at all').
The depth of the uncertainty is illustrated by the regularity with which courts uphold claims
of qualified immunity by government officials sued for violating parents' constitutional rights of
child-rearing autonomy. In the view of many courts, "the amorphous nature of [the parents]
liberty interest in familial relationships" excludes the sort of clarity necessary to overcome a
claim of qualified immunity. Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992). As one district
court explained,
[t]he weight of parents' interest in the care and custody of their child balanced against
the state's interest in the protection of the child from harm naturally leaves a court
engaged in this type of inquiry in a quandary as to what plaintiffs' clearly established
rights may be in a particular situation. It is for this reason that many courts have found
that, in the context of child care workers investigating and bringing child abuse
proceedings, there are no "clearly established" substantive due process rights held by
parents.
Callahan v. Lancaster-Lebanon Inter. Unit 13, 880 F. Supp. 319, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citation
omitted); accord Franz v. Lytle, 791 F. Supp. 827, 833 (D. Kan. 1992), affd, 997 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1993).
110. Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 852 (emphasis added); see Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188
F.3d 531, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Edwards, C.J., concurring in part) ("[Tihe case law
suggests that if there is a significant and important goal to be achieved that generally enhances
the health, safety, or welfare of unemancipated minors, the state may pass legislation *o achieve
that goal, so long as the legislation does not unduly tread on parents' rights to raise their
children.'). Indeed, Justice Stewart seemed to take precisely this tack in explaining why the
outlawing of racially segregated private schools implicated no fundamental right of parents who
desired such education for their children:
The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have a constitutional right to send
their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools that
offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976) (citations omitted).
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about the sanctity of the family and the moderation which it consistently demonstrates when actually called upon to review state intrusions into the family.' Such dissonance is by no means unique to the
context of family privacy. Commentators and dissenting Justices have
pointed out many other instances in which the Court seemed in fact to
apply a standard different from the one that was formally said to
govern." Some of this fudging may be endemic to the enterprise of
substantive due process review and may simply reflect, as Professor
Carl Schneider has suggested, the Court's discomfort generally with
the uncertain boundaries and implications of its undertaking.'
And,
yet, the Court's reluctance to apply traditional strict scrutiny seems
both clearer and more consistent in its fundamental-rights cases relating to the family. In this context, there seem to be additional forces
at work driving the Court to compromise the rigor of its review.
Although there may be other influences as well, two background considerations seem largely to account for the Court's tacit
acknowledgment that traditional strict scrutiny is ill-suited to the
task of mediating between the state and the individual in the context
of the family. The first is a sense, often though not always left unstated, that the stakes for the community are higher when it comes to
regulating the institution of the family than in many other areas of
important personal liberties. When the state restricts the freedom of
individuals to migrate across state lines,"" for instance, or to cast a
ballot,"' the state's possible regulatory interests-ensuring an adequate provision of public services, say, or orderly elections-probably
strike most observers as legitimate but not overwhelming. That intuition comfortably supports use of a constitutional standard that
sharply limits the state's ability to promote those interests, because it
seems unlikely that the community stands much to lose if the government is sometimes unable to carry its burden of exceptional justification. Thus, traditional strict scrutiny of state action burdening the

111. See Schneider, supra note 64, at 86 (noting "doubts about the correspondence between

the [scrutiny] test invoked [in the Court's family privacy cases] and the test actually used).
112. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 244 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 72-73 & n.2 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 3 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK,supranote 31, § 18.3, at 224; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of
Categorizationand Balancing,63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 299-300 (1992).
113. See Schneider, supra note 64, at 86, 88 (suggesting that the Court may undertake "sub
rosa adjustments of its standards" in some cases because of "the Court's uncertainty about the

right to privacy itself and about how far it may take the Court").
114. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1525-27 (1999) (discussing fundamental right of
travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (same).
115. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184
(1979) (discussing fundamental right to vote); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (same).
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fundamental rights of interstate travel or political participation seems
to reflect our collective judgment that the community can afford, in
these contexts, to subordinate more systematically its interests in
regulation to those of the regulated individuals.
The balance seems different, however, in the context of state
authority over the family. While few would deny that the stakes of
state intervention for the individual are at least as high in this context
as in the realm of other fundamental liberties, there is a widely held
sense that the stakes of non-intervention for the community may be
more significant here. "It is through the family," Justice Powell once
observed, "that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural. '16 That belief, deeply rooted in law
and elsewhere, 17 suggests that the community has an enormous,
unparalleled stake in the family-society's very ability to replicate its
own values and culture in the next generation.' 8 It is the continuing
force of this belief that gives so much heat to current debates over socalled "family values" issues, such as same-sex marriage, divorce, and
single parenthood."' And it is partly this grandiose assessment of the
stakes for the community that leads the Court tacitly to retreat from a
constitutional standard that would narrowly cabin the state's regulatory authority.
The intuition that the balance between the

116. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
117. More than a century ago, the Court considered it obvious that "no legislation can be
supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth,
... than that which seeks to establish it on the basis of the idea of the family,... the sure
foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization .... ." Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S.
15, 45 (1885). That assessment, and others of similar import, finds continual affirmation in
subsequent opinions. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1890) (quoting Murphy);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651-52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
118. For a nuanced account of the "socializing" function of many laws affecting family, see
Schneider, supranote 64, at 97-118.
119. Professor David Chambers has explained the intensity of the debate over same-sex
marriage in these terms:
In our country, as in most societies throughout the world, marriage is the single most
significant communal ceremony of belonging. It marks not just a joining of two people,
but a joining of families and an occasion for tribal celebration and solidarity. In a lawdrenched country such as ours, permission for same-sex couples to marry under the law
would signify the acceptance of lesbians and gay men as equal citizens more profoundly
than any other nondiscrimination laws that might be adopted. Most proponents of samesex marriage, within and outside gay and lesbian communities, want marriage first and
foremost for this recognition. Most conservative opponents oppose it for the same reason.
David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 450-51 (1996) (footnote omitted); accord
Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond
PoliticalLiberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1876-77 (1997); see also Schneider, supra note 64, at 11617 ('The social and political controversy over the privacy doctrine is in part a battle about
modernity and modernization .... [Tihe question the battle raises is what kind of society we are
to be.").
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individual's interests in autonomy and the community's interests in
regulation may be more even in the context of the family than in other
areas of fundamental liberty counsels against a lopsided scrutiny in
which the state's interests are virtually foreordained to lose.'20
The second factor driving the Court toward a more flexible
standard of constitutional review is one that it has acknowledged in
its abortion cases, but which has application to other family-privacy
controversies as well. More than with other fundamental rights, an
exercise of one of the rights of family privacy may be "fraught with
consequences for others,""' often posing a clash between conflicting
individual rights.
Abortion provides only the most obvious
illustration.
The woman's fundamental right to terminate her
pregnancy necessarily, of course, poses a threat to "the life or potential
life of the unborn."'
But it also may present conflicts with the
"privacy" interests of other family members-with the procreative
desires of the potential father,' for instance, or with the child-rearing
authority of the parents of a pregnant teenager."4 In this context,
vindication of one fundamental right may well require subordination
of another. It is, in significant measure, this gnawing reality that
ultimately has led the Court to recognize that traditional
fundamental-rights analysis simply does not quite fit. The strictures
of the usual search for "compelling interests" and "narrow tailoring"
make it impossible for a court to comprehend the full complexity of
intersecting public and private interests. Indeed, it is largely on this

120. Despite Justice O'Connor's recent protestation to the contrary in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), the Court generally has
seemed to accept the accuracy of Professor Gerald Gunther's famous description of strict scrutiny
as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 TermForeworck In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); see also Sullivan, supranote 112, at 296.
121. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
122. Id. at 870 (O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, J.J., plurality opinion). Professor Laurence
Tribe, for example, criticized the Court's first pass at abortion in Roe for failing to demonstrate
"a more cautious sensitivity to the mutual helplessness of the mother and the unborn that could
have accented the need for affirmative legislative action to moderate the clash between the two."
Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties,
and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 342 (1985).
123. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; see also id. at 895 ("recogniz[ing] that a husband has a 'deep
and proper concern and interest... in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth and development
of the fetus she is carrying'") (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976));

EVA R. RUBIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY: IDEOLOGY AND ISSUES 57-58
(1986).
124. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644-51 (1979) (upholding constitutional right of
competent minor to elect abortion without parental guidance).
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basis that some have questioned the usefulness of rights-based
discourse in family law at all.'
Although the Court has come to acknowledge this potential for
conflict in emphasizing the constitutional and moral "unique[ness]" of
abortion, 6 similar conflicts occur in other family-privacy contexts.
The gravity of the personal stakes in the abortion decision may
distinguish it somewhat, but the conflict of rights is occasioned not by
anything unique to the particulars of abortion, but rather by the fact
that a matter of wide significance is being decided within the context
of a family. The decision of one adult about whether to bear a child
inescapably touches in a profound way the interests of other members
of an existing or potential family system. In the same way, decisions
about who is to have custody of a child, how a child is to be raised,
whether certain persons shall be permitted to marry or divorce, and so
on, are likely to present not a narrow struggle between individual and
state, but a more complex blend of conflicting or potentially conflicting
interests of basic importance.
Thus, for example, when the Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder'l
vindicated the fundamental liberty of Amish parents to refuse to send
their children to public high school, it was forced to sidestep the contention that it was subordinating the independent "constitutionally
protectible interests"'28 of the children themselves. Although the majority opinion largely painted the case as an uncomplicated struggle
between the bureaucratic state and nonconforming Amish families,"
Justice White in concurrence and Justice Douglas in dissent apprehended a more complex picture. For them, the question of the state's
regulatory power over education implicated not only the child-rearing
and religious liberty of parents, but also the most basic interest of
children in ultimately choosing a life outside the confines of their

125. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
121-30 (1991); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 135 (1993);
RUBIN, supranote 123, at 6-7, 171-72; Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood,98 YALE
L.J. 293, 295-96 (1988); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,Kinship, and
Sexual Privacy - Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MCH. L. REV. 463, 468-71
(1983); Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia,76 CAL. L. REV. 151, 15758, 164-65 (1988) [hereinafter Schneider, Rights Discourse]; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1858 (1985)
[hereinafter Schneider, Moral Discourse];Schneider, supranote 64, at 110-13.
126. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; cf. id. at 857 (suggesting that the abortion right recognized in
Roe v. Wade could be "classif[ied] ... as sui generis").
127. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
128. Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
129. See id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]he Court's analysis
assumes that the only interests at stake in this case are those of the Amish parents on the one
hand, and those of the State on the other7).
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parents' religion."' Resolving one claim necessarily concluded the
other.'1
Likewise, when the Court in Santosky v. Kramer"' vindicated
the fundamental liberty interest of parents in "'the companionship,
care, custody, and management"' of their children by demanding the
use of the clear-and-convincing evidence standard in proceedings to
terminate parental rights, 33' the Court was required to pass judgment
on the independent interest of children in avoiding continued exposure
to potentially life-threatening abuse. Although the Court minimized
the conflict by willfully presuming that "the child and his parents
[will] share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of
their natural relationship, '3. its decision to constrain the state's
ability to move against abusive or neglectful parents necessarily
compromised profoundly important interests of children in cases
where the evidence of abuse is accurate though not overwhelming.
So, too, vindication of a parent's constitutional claims to child
custody or visitation. may require some compromise of the constitutional interests of a competing claimant to custody,"' of a custodial
parent in controlling with whom a child will associate,"' or of the child
herself in maintaining a relationship with a different custodian."8

130. See id. at 240 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
In Justice Douglas' view,
[i]f a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be
forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have
today. The child may decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel. It is the
student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to
what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of
their own destiny.
Id.
131. See, e.g., id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) ("If the parents in this case are
allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose the parents' notions of religious
duty upon their children.').
132. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
133. Id. at 758-59 (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 760; see also RUBIN, supra note 123, at 179 (characterizing the Court's
"assumption that the parents' and the child's interests are identical" as a 'legal fiction"); Meyer,
supra note 97, at 835-37 (discussing Court's habit of giving short shrift to claims that children's
interests conflict with parents' child-rearing rights).
135. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); see also supra notes 4-5.
136. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 84647 (1977) (assuming, but not deciding, that foster parents might have a constitutionally
protected interest in maintaining a custody of their foster child).
137. Compare, e.g., In re J.A., 962 P.2d 173, 184 (Alaska 1998) (Matthews, C.J., dissenting)
(stating that, absent clear and convincing proof of unfitness or misconduct endangering the child,
a parent is constitutionally entitled to maintain some contact, even over the objections of the
custodial parent), In re A.C., 643 So. 2d 743, 746-47 (La. 1994) (same), and Mullin v. Phelps, 647
A.2d 714, 724 (Vt. 1994) (same), with Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d 285, 291-92 (N.D. 1999) (striking
down statute permitting grandparents to seek visitation with children on the ground that it
violates "parents' fundamental liberty interest in controlling the persons with whom their
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In this way, there is an essential similarity between constitutional claims respecting abortion and those relating to other matters
of family life. In each case, recognition that the controversy involves a
potential clash of different and competing individual interests pushes
1 39
the Court toward a more flexible standard of constitutional review.
Despite this commonality, however, only in the context of abortion
(and there only recently) has the Court come close to acknowledging
frankly the more limited nature of its review.

II. FALLACY AND FALLOUT
Given the unusual complexity of many regulatory controversies
affecting the family, the Court surely has been right to moderate its
constitutional scrutiny when considering claims of family privacy. It
has been quite wrong, however, to maintain the illusion, at least outside the context of abortion, that it is adhering to traditional, undifferentiated fundamental-rights analysis. In this section, I contend that
the disjunction between what the Court says about family privacy and
how the Court actually goes about the task of policing state regulation
of family life is seriously troublesome and ultimately corrosive of the
very values the doctrine is meant to exalt.
A. The Constitution as Arbiter of Intra-FamilyDisputes
Strict scrutiny is typically justified in the context of family privacy as the most secure means of cordoning off the "private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter...... The choice of a standard
that severely constrains the intermeddling impulse of state legislators
and bureaucrats is said to be necessary to minimize the role of the

children may associate"), and In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998) (en banc), cert.
grantedsub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 11 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1999) (No. 99-138).
138. See In re Guardianship of Zachary H., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7, 16-17 (Cal. App. 1999) (holding
that a child had a fundamental constitutional liberty interest in remaining in the custody of nonparent caregivers and that interest prevailed over a father's constitutional interest in obtaining
custody); Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to
Maintain Relationships With Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358 (1994); Suellyn
Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to ProtectionFrom Transfer Trauma in a ContestedAdoption Case,
2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 41, 42, 53 (1995).
139. As Dean Sullivan has observed:
The suspension of categorical reasoning [such as that embodied in strict scrutiny] in favor
of... an [intermediate-scrutiny or balancing] approach typically comes about from a
crisis in analogical reasoning. A set of cases comes along that just can't be steered readily
onto the strict scrutiny or the rationality track.
Sullivan, supra note 112, at 297.
140. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
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government in ordering family affairs. In a substantial number of
family-privacy disputes, in which all members of a family are unified
in their opposition to state intervention, strict scrutiny achieves precisely that goal. The Court's first family-privacy cases, for instance,
were of this character. In Meyer and Pierce, the conflicts appeared to
be between unified families, who desired certain forms of education for
their children, and the state, which sought to deny the children that
education for its own purposes. Strict scrutiny in such a case does
seem calculated to keep government "out" of the family, maximizing
the liberty of each family member to decide collectively what sort of
education to pursue.
There are many other cases, however, in which the interests of
individual family members may be splintered, and in these cases it is
an illusion to say that the courts' aggressive protection of "family
privacy" keeps government out of the family. Where a family is fractured by internal conflict and one member turns to the government to
resolve a dispute-as when a non-custodial parent seeks a court order
for visitation-the fact is that the question of constitutional interpretation is often one of deciding which governmental actor will weigh in,
the legislatures or agencies through a statutory or administrative
solution or the courts through the Constitution. If a court recognizes a
constitutional entitlement to contact, for example, and therefore compels the custodial parent to comply with a court-ordered visitation
schedule (and perhaps even to say some encouraging things about the
visiting parent141), the state plainly has interjected itself in a most
forceful way into the family. Likewise, when a court, on constitutional
grounds, orders that a child be separated from the family who has
reared her and placed in the custody of a biological parent whom the
child regards as a stranger, it is wholly implausible to say that the
Constitution has vindicated the "privacy" or "autonomy" of the family
by excluding governmental intermeddling. The reality in these cases
is that a substantive rule for resolving a family's internal conflict has
been located in the Constitution.
In important ways, the point here is parallel to Professor Cass
Sunstein's insight about Lochner v. New York," upon which the early

141. See Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 1292-93 (Fla. 1991) (upholding a trial court order
compelling the custodial parent "to do everything in her power to create in the minds of [the
children] a loving, caring feeling toward [their father] ... [and] to convince the children that it

[was] the mother's desire that they see their father and love their father).
142. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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family-privacy cases were partly founded."" Lochner's imposition of
aggressive limitations on state economic legislation was originally
justified as necessary to keep the governmeht out of the marketplace,
carving out (to borrow a phrase) a "private realm" of free exchange
"which the state cannot enter." " Yet, as Professor Sunstein demonstrated, the presupposition that the striking down of wage-and-hours
legislation would leave the bargaining between employer and employee untouched by state intermeddling was false. This bargaining
remained channeled by an intricate web of common-law rules and by a
disparity of economic power that was itself partly a product of the
state's regulatory regime. 5 Thus, the Lochner Court could assert that
its review negated state interference in the parties' exchange only by
disregarding as part of the baseline or "natural" state of affairs a large
body of powerful and coercive state influences.146
Aggressive constitutional review of legislative or administrative action affecting the family sometimes proceeds on a similar set of
assumptions. Although the fundamental right of family privacy is
premised upon the existence of a "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter," state regulation in fact infuses and undergirds
most of our baseline assumptions about what that family life entails.
The state holds a monopoly over the formation and dissolution of
marriages, defining who may enter into what most still regard as "the
most important relation in life"'47 and the terms upon which that
relation will cease. 8 Common-law and statutory rules for centuries
have helped to reinforce and entrench certain assumptions about the
"natural" allocation of authority within the family among parents and

143. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987); see also supra
notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing the interrelationship between Lochner and the
Court's early family-privacy cases).
144. Prince,321 U.S. at 166.
145. See Sunstein, supra note 143, at 874-76.
146. See id. at 882 ("We may thus understand Lochner as a case that failed because it
selected, as the baseline for constitutional analysis, a system that was state-created, hardly
neutral, and without prepolitical status.').
147. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)
(quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)). That marriage retains this primacy in the
minds of most Americans is borne out by recent polling data. See Norval D. Glenn, Values,
Attitudes, and the State of American Marriage,in PROMISES To KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA (David Popenoe et al. eds., 1996) ("marriage remains very important to
adult Americans-probably as important as it has ever been); Institution of Marriage Is
Weakening, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1999, at 12 (concluding that most young people,
though marrying later, continue to regard marriage as ultimately important to happiness).
148. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (noting state's "monopolization"
over means of divorce).
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children and men and women. 9 The law sets out, sometimes in elaborate detail, the respective obligations and entitlements of spouses,
parents and children. By zealously embracing gender-based definitions of the appropriate family roles of men and women," as well as
ancient notions of parental dominion over children, 5' the law has
helped in a crucial way to embed these assumptions deeply, perhaps
indelibly, in the fabric of family life.'52 Having thus helped to construct
and order the manner in which family members regard and relate to
one another, the law cannot then stand back and plausibly claim that
it has no hand in how family members resolve their internal disputes.
In this light, when a court affirms the constitutional right of a
parent to bar all contact between a child and her grandparents,' for
example, the court is in no real sense preserving some pre-political
autonomy of the family, but is instead enforcing a substantive policy
preference (in that case, for parental discretion over grandparent
M
The Constitution then
visitation) attributed to the Constitution.'"
becomes not so much a shield against majoritarian state intervention,

149. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 269-70 (1990); Teitelbaum, supranote 90, at 1139-44.
150. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (legislative limitations on employment of
women justified by "[her] maternal functions); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141
(1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (exclusion of women from legal profession justified because "[tihe
paramount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother'). These cases, of course, are hardly ancient artifacts. It was, after all, only about two
decades ago that a number of states had statutes on their books assigning unilateral
decisionmaking power over family matters to husbands. A North Dakota statute, for examplerepealed only in 1979-provided that: 'The husband is the head of the family. He may choose
any reasonable place or mode of living and the wife must conform thereto." N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-07-02 (West 1978), repealed,1979 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 195, § 1, p. 426.
151. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-CenteredPerspective on
Parents'Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1810-11 (1993); Woodhouse, supra note 35, at 104150.
152. As Professor Marsha Garrison has written, "[tiamily governance... represents a
perhaps unique blend of tradition-based and state-defined prerogatives. Although the family
may well be the most intimate and private of associations, the terms of its governance rest to a
substantial extent on public prescription." Marsha Garrison, Toward a ContractarianAccount of
Family Governance, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 241, 242; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Family Governance
Professor Katherine Franke, for
in the Age of Divorce, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 211, 211, 215.
example, has argued that the extension of the right of legal marriage, with all of its regulatory
incidents, to emancipated slaves ultimately transformed many norms and expectations
concerning the construction of intimate relationships among African-Americans. See generally
Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American
Marriages,11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999).
153. See, e.g., In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), cert. granted sub nom.
Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999) (No. 99-138).
154. See Teitelbaum, supra note 90, at 1178-79 (noting that "talk of family autonomy ignores
the influence of the law itself in creating the imbalances of power within the family').
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as a rule of decision for anti-majoritarian state resolution of family
conflicts.
Judicial use of strict scrutiny, often thought justified in the
cause of family autonomy, can then end up making the state's intrusion into the family clumsier and more heavy-handed. Whereas state
legislatures might be capable of concocting a compromise solution that
would be sensitive to the complex of competing individual family
interests at stake, constitutional rules of decision tend to take more
absolute and rigid forms.'55 Whereas the degree of intrusion might be
relatively modest under the legislature's compromise approach-say, a
requirement that parents tolerate occasional visits between child and
grandparents, assuming some substantial benefit to the child-it is
likely to be starker under a constitutional rule-say, the complete
severance of contact between child and grandparents." Thus, by its
exaggerated rhetoric about the Constitution's service of "family autonomy" and its insistent adherence to the illusion of traditional fundamental-rights strict scrutiny, the Court ultimately encourages a particular, and often particularly blunt, form of state intervention into
the family.
B. The Constitutionas Stalwart of Family Conformity
The Court's refusal to embrace overtly a more flexible standard
of constitutional review poses still a second paradox for the ideal of
family privacy. The awkward rigidity of the strict scrutiny formula
sometimes encourages the Court to preserve a field for reasonable
government regulation by narrowly construing the scope of familyprivacy rights at the threshold. The result is that not only are considerable expanses of family life left without any meaningful constitutional protection, but also that the Court's narrow construction
expresses state preferences that themselves serve to regulate family
life still further.
1. The Narrow Depth of Fundamental Rights
If a court means to apply strict scrutiny faithfully, there are, of
course, only two ways to sustain government regulation affecting the
family: either the court must find that the challenged action clears the

155. See Schneider, supranote 64, at 110-18; Tribe, supranote 122, at 342.
156. For example, the Washington Supreme Court suggested that the Constitution would
permit a court to overcome a parenes objections to visitation only where a child would suffer
"severe psychological harm" from a loss of contact. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d at 30.
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extraordinary hurdle of being narrowly tailored to a compelling state
interest or it must find that the government action implicates no
fundamental privacy right in the first instance. The Court remains
deeply reluctant to follow the first of these paths. A quarter-century
after Professor Gunther's famous characterization of strict scrutiny as
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact,"'5 the Court's cases continue to
reflect the assumption that an initial determination that the challenged action burdens a fundamental right spells its doom." As a
result, the real battle in most family-privacy cases occurs at what is
nominally the threshold of the constitutional analysis: litigants and
judges alike understand that if the government is to win its case, the
court must conclude at the outset that the government's actions do not
'
burden any constitutionally privileged aspect of family life. 59
This understanding undoubtedly has pushed the Court in a
number of cases to slice family-privacy rights rather thin. In the context of marriage, for example, the Court has explained broadly that
the freedom of the individual to choose a marriage partner is given
privileged constitutional protection because it is "essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness."" And yet, in almost the next breath,
members of the Court have balked at the implications of that holding.
It would be intolerable, Justices Powell and Stewart insisted in
Zablocki v. Redhail, to subject all regulations restricting entry into
marriage to strict scrutiny because that would almost certainly condemn a broad swath of traditional restrictions-such as state bans on
incestuous, bigamous, or same-sex marriages-that the Justices
regarded as eminently reasonable. 6 ' The solution, then, in order to
leave adequate leeway for government regulation, was to define the
fundamental right to marry in narrower terms-to recogmize, say, a

157. Gunther, supranote 120, at 8.
158. See Schneider, supra note 64, at 81; Sullivan, supranote 112, at 296 ('The key move in
litigation under a two-tier system is steering the case onto the preferred track. The genius of
this tracking device is that outcomes can be determined at the threshold without the need for
messy balancing.').
159. Thus, in the Supreme Court's most recent family-privacy case, Troxel v. Granville, No.
99-138, the petitioners centered their defense of the Washington statute authorizing courtordered visitation over the objections of a child's parents on the argument that heightened
scrutiny was not required. See Petitioner's Brief at 22, Troxel v. Granville (No. 99-138) available
in, 1999 WL 1079965. Although, acknowledging that some visitation orders might be so intrusive
as to burden a parent's fundamental interest in child-rearing, the petitioners contended that
most such orders imposed so minimal an interference with the parent-child relationship that no
exceptional justification was required of the government. See id. at 32-34.
160. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (describing marriage as "'creating the most
important relation in life'" (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)).
161. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 392 (Stewart,
J., concurring in judgment).
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fundamental right to marry someone of a different race but not a
fundamental right to marry someone of the same sex. 6'
The Court has taken a similar course in other areas of family
privacy. When, two years after Roe," the Court wished to uphold the
authority of states to ban abortions by non-physicians, it did not do so
on the plausible ground that the states' compelling interest in maternal health justified such a limitation of the woman's right to choose."
Rather, it held that Roe had recognized only "a woman's right to a
clinical abortion by medically competent personnel,"'" and thus
"prosecutions for abortions conducted by nonphysicians infringe upon
no realm of personal privacy secured by the Constitution.""
Similarly, in reviewing zoning regulations restricting household membership to preferred family forms, the Court has discerned a
fundamental right of members of an extended biological family to "live
together as a family,"'1 but no such right for persons who do not share
a relationship of "blood, adoption, or marriage."" Moreover, although
the fundamental right of kinship is violated by an ordinance that
would force a biologically related family to move to a neighboring
suburb in order to remain together, 6 ' the same right is not implicated
M

162. See id. at 398-99 (Powell, J., concurring); cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
984 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is precisely the conclusion reached by the Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55-57 (Haw. 1993). But see Brause v. Bureau of
Vital Stats., 24 Far. L. Rep. (BNA) 2015, 2017 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding
that ban on same-sex marriage infringed fundamental constitutional right of privacy).
163. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
164. See Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1975) (per curiam).
165. Id. at 10.
166. Id. at 11.
167. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977); see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 810 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). More recently, in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292
(1993), the Court applied minimal rationality review to federal Immigration and Naturalization
Service rules that permitted illegal alien children to be released to the custody of parents,
guardians, or certain other "close relatives," but not to more distant relatives or unrelated
caregivers. See id. at 322 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that INS rules would not permit
release of a child to the custody of a cousin). The Court found no fundamental right implicated,
see id. at 302-03, and thus required no special justification by the government for its preference
to relegate the children to "government-operated or government-selected child-care
institution[s]" rather than unite them with family caregivers who failed to meet the
government's test for "close relatives." Id. at 302.
168. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 3 (1974). In Belle Terre, the Court applied
the rational-basis test to uphold a zoning ordinance that banned residential households
consisting of persons who were unrelated by "blood, adoption, or marriage." Id. at 3, 8-9. The
rational-basis test was appropriate, the Court later explained, because such unrelated
households do not qualify as families entitled to special constitutional protection. See id. at 8-9;
see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-99; see also supra Part I.B.3; cf. City of Edmonds v. Oxford
House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732-35 (1995) (considering similar ordinance's compatibility with
federal Fair Housing Act).
169. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 505-06.
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by federal immigration laws that would force the same family to move
abroad.17
The Court's definition of the fundamental right of parents to
make basic decisions about child rearing has been just as erratic. The
constitutional right, the Court has held, encompasses a parent's decision to send her child to a private school that teaches foreign languages or the tenets of a religious faith, 1' but not to one that practices
racial segregation. 72 Nor apparently does the right include, at least in
the view of some Justices, the freedom of parents to exempt their
children from corporal punishment doled out in public schools' or,
conversely, to impose unduly harsh physical punishments themselves." As one lower court explained it, the Court's cases ultimately
teach not that the Constitution gives parents a fundamental right to
make their own child-rearing decisions, but rather only that it accords
a fundamental right to make "venerab[le]" child-rearing decisions."
170. In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), the Court applied minimal scrutiny to federal
immigration laws that denied preferred family status to unwed fathers and their illegitimate
children. The Court rejected the contention that the laws, which effectively prevented children
living in the United States from being reunited with their only surviving parent, a Jamaican
national, see id. at 790 n.3, should be subject to heightened scrutiny as an infringement of the
fundamental right of families to live together, see id. at 794-95; id. at 810 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
171. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923);.
172. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176-79 (1976).
173. See Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), affid mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
174. Justice White expressed this view in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians:
The Court's decisions in Moore v. East Cleveland, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Meyer
v. Nebraska can be read for the proposition that parents have a fundamental liberty to
make decisions with respect to the upbringing of their children. But no one would
suggest that this fundamental liberty extends to assaults committed upon children by
their parents. It is not the case that parents have a fundamental liberty to engage in
such activities and that the State may intrude to prevent them only because it has a
compelling interest in the well-being of children; rather, such activities, by their very
nature, should be viewed as outside the scope of the fundamental liberty interest.
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 793 n.2 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting). But see Richard Garner, Fundamentally Speaking: Application of Ohio's Domestic
Violence Laws in ParentalDiscipline Cases-A Parental Perspective, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 16
(1998) (concluding that all "[s]tate laws purporting to regulate parental discipline, directly or by
implication," impinge upon parents' fundamental child-rearing rights and must be subjected to
strict scrutiny).
175. See Baker, 395 F. Supp. at 300 (emphasis added); see also Burt, supra note 102, at 33940 ('Thiis is the thread that can be traced into a coherent pattern among the votes of the
conservative bloc Justices... that a specific, authoritarian style of parenting rather than the
status of parent itself warrants constitutional deference.').
The D.C. Circuit recently tried to slice parents' child-rearing rights from another direction.
The court held that a juvenile curfew law that kept children home without regard to whether
their parents authorized late-night activities implicated no fundamental right of the parents.
We glean from [the Court's parental-rights] cases ..- that insofar as a parent can be
thought to have a fundamental right, as against the state, in the upbringing of his or her
children, that right is focused on the parents' control of the home and the parents'
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By parsing the fundamental rights of family privacy in this
way, the Court is able to maintain the veneer of aggressively protecting incursions on fundamental rights while still leaving plenty of room
for reasonable state regulation of family activities and decisions.
Regulations the Court thinks reasonable and wishes to sustain can be
safely steered toward rationality review, away from the shoals of strict
scrutiny, by adjusting the scope of the privacy right. The byproduct of
the Court's handiwork, however, is a fundamental right whose
boundaries are surely as tortuous and bizarre as those of the North
Carolina congressional districts the Court so ridiculed in Shaw v.
Reno.78
Admittedly, the Court typically justifies its parsing by reference to history and tradition, rather than to its own assessment of the
reasonableness or desirability of the particular state action. 7 Thus,
for example, we are sometimes told that the reason why there is a
fundamental right for two persons of the opposite sex to marry, but
not for three or four persons to do so, is that society deeply venerates
the first choice but not the latter."' But the Court has been far from
consistent about defining the scope of fundamental rights in this way.
It is impossible, for instance, to square the Court's discernment of
fundamental rights in Griswold v. Connecticut,' Eisenstadt v.
Baird," or Loving v. Virginia,8' to name just a few illustrations,''

interest in controlling.., the formal education of children. It does not extend to a
parent's right to unilaterally determine when and if children will be on the streetscertainly at night. That is not among the "intimate family decisions" encompassed by
such a right.
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citations
omitted).
The court's attempt to cabin the constitutional right to decisions affecting specific subject
matters-activities inside the home and "formal education"-drew a sharp rebuke from Chief
Judge Edwards. See id. at 549 (Edwards, C.J., concurring in part) ("[A] parent's stake in the
rearing of his or her child surely extends beyond the front door of the family residence and even
beyond the school classroom.').
176. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 634-36 (1993) (describing North Carolina's District 1 as
looking like "a 'bug splattered on a windshield,'" and District 12 as "even more unusually
shaped!) (citation omitted).
177. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 & n.19 (1997). See generally
Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and ConstitutionalismBefore the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 173 (tracing the historical roots of this approach).
178. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
179. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding a fundamental right of
married couples to use contraceptives).
180. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (finding a fundamental right of unmarried
couples to use contraceptives).
181. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (finding a fundamental right of interracial
couples to marry).
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with the narrow tradition-bound approach suggested in some of the

Court's more recent cases."

Although the Court consistently regards

traditional societal consensus as relevant to the discernment of fundamental rights, the Court has yet to develop any stable consensus
about the level of generality or specificity with which the historical
inquiry should be framed" or about the extent to which other considerations besides tradition are also relevant." As a result, the Court
retains considerable room to maneuver in defining the scope of fundamental rights. And it is not unduly cynical to conclude that the
Court has sometimes emphasized the narrower, tradition-based methodology in cases where it was inclined to sustain the particular government regulation, lapsing into more generous formulations in cases
where it is more dubious about the government's methods or
motives."
M

182. See also, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987) (finding a fundamental right of
prisoners to marry while incarcerated); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (finding a
fundamental right to possess obscene material within the home).
183. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (acknowledging that the narrow "mode of historical analysis
[advocated by Justice Scalia's plurality opinion] ... may be somewhat inconsistent with our past
decisions in this area") (citations omitted); id. at 137-40 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. For instance, in deciding whether the Constitution gives heightened protection to an
individuars choice of a polygamous marriage, it is presently unclear whether the Court should
define the relevant right as the right to marry or, more specifically, as the right to plural
marriage. Loving's conclusion that a fundamental right was burdened by Virginia's antimiscegenation law, see Loving, 388 U.S. at 12, at a time when sixteen states still had such
prohibitions on their books, see id. at 6 n.5, suggests the former approach, see Casey, 505 U.S. at
847-48, though recent cases have taken a narrower view, see, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997) (relevant question is not whether tradition supports an individual's right
to control the manner of his death, but whether tradition venerates "a right to commit suicide
which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so"); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190
(1986) (relevant question is not whether tradition supports a right of sexual intimacy, but
whether it honors a "right [of] homosexuals to engage in sodomy"). The choice obviously will
determine whether the Court will find a deeply rooted, traditional consensus supporting the
right. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
73-80 (1991).
185. Thus, although tradition and history are the exclusive determinants for Justice Scalia,
and were denominated "crucial 'guideposts"' for the Court in Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, they
have figured less prominently in other recent cases. In Casey, for example, the Court
admonished that the "boundaries [of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence] are not
susceptible of expression as a simple rule," Casey, 505 U.S. at 849, and ultimately justified
recognition of the right to abortion not in traditional consensus but in the profoundly "intimate
and personal" nature of the abortion decision, see id. at 851. More recently still, in City of
Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), a plurality insisted that the long historical pedigree
of anti-loitering laws did not preclude recognition of a "'fundamental right to loiter."' See id. at
1857 n.20 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); cfid. at 1881-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (complaining
that the plurality's analysis was "[iln derogation of the framework we articulated only two Terms
ago in Glucksberg").
186. See Schneider, supranote 64, at 88 n.52 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), as examples of cases in which the Court narrowly
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A large measure of what is driving the Court's occasional
manipulation of the boundaries of family privacy is the common supposition that the rigidity of the two-tier analysis traditionally used in
fundamental-rights makes the threshold definition outcome-determinative: because it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to credit
state interests in regulation under strict scrutiny, reasonable government regulation can be sustained only by narrowing the scope of what
constitutes protectible family privacy."7 In this way, the adherence to
an analytical framework that appears to be more protective of family
privacy by demanding the most exceptional justification for government regulation ultimately may be corrosive of family privacy by
leading the Court to construe the underlying rights more narrowly.
For family relationships and activities excluded by the Court's parsing
approach-such as the developed father-daughter relationship in the
Michael H. case-the results can be disastrous." The costs, moreover,
are likely to be felt more widely still in the future as more families
take new and non-traditional forms..9 and as the Court's methodology
leaves yet more swaths of family life to the minimal protection of

construed the scope of underlying privacy rights in order to uphold the challenged state action);
cf. Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 554-57 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Rogers, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (suggesting that the D.C. Circuit has engaged in similar
manipulation of the "family privacy" right).
187. Professor Anthony Amsterdam once made a similar observation about the Fourth
Amendment:
The fourth amendment ...is ordinarily treated as a monolith: wherever it restricts police
activities at all, it subjects them to the same extensive restrictions that it imposes upon
physical entries into dwellings. To label any police activity a "search" or "seizure" within
the ambit of the amendment is to impose those restrictions upon it. On the other hand, if
it is not labeled a "search" or "seizure," it is subject to no significant restrictions of any
kind....
Obviously, this kind of all-or-nothing approach to the amendment puts
extraordinary strains upon the process of drawing its outer boundary lines.
Anthony G. Amersterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388
(1974) (footnotes omitted).
188. In Michael H., the Court upheld a California law that prevented a biological father from
seeking court-ordered visitation with a daughter conceived during an extramarital affair.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 131. As a result, the father was likely to lose all future contact with the
girl, despite the fact that he had once lived with the child and helped to raise her. See id. at 14344, 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. See, e.g., ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY 1-3, 19, 117-18 (Mary
Ann Mason et al. eds., 1998) (identifying changing trends in family composition and
identification); THE CHANGING FAMILY: FAMILY FORMS AND FAMILY LAW (John Eekelaar et al.
eds. 1998); FRANCES K. GOLDSCHEIDER & LINDA J. WAITE, NEW FAMILIES, NO FAMILIES? THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 16-19, 67-72 (1991); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica
Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planningfor UnmarriedCommitted Partners:Empirical Lessons for
a Preventive and TherapeuticApproach, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 418 (1999) (concluding, based on
demographic data, that "cohabitation has emerged as an important new family form in the
United States'); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "It All Depends on What You Mean By Home'"
Toward a CommunitarianTheory of the 'Nontraditional'Family,1996 UTAH L. REV. 569.
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rationality review. Openly embracing a more flexible standard of
review, therefore, could be expected to result in judicial recognition of
a broader range of family relationships and decisions entitled to
heightened constitutional protection."' The historical pedigree of the
regulated family activity or entity would remain relevant to determining the extent of constitutional protection,' but the Court would
be less likely to feel impelled to cut the analysis short at the outset
through a miserly definition of the fundamental right.
2. The Regulatory Rhetoric of Constitutional Denial
The Court's current approach to protecting family privacy has a
Trojan-Horse quality in another way as well. Not only does the

Court's nominal allegiance to the strict scrutiny framework lead to a
narrowing of what qualifies as family privacy, the Court's
differentiation among families in doling out constitutional privilege
itself serves as an independent means of regulation.
When the Court rules against a constitutional claimant by
finding that the regulated relationship or activity falls outside the
protected scope of family privacy, it often buttresses that conclusion
with evidence of society's traditional indifference or contempt. In
Michael H., for example, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion explained
that the claimant had no fundamental right to preserve his relationship with a daughter conceived in an extramarital affair because
society did not "respect" their relationship.'
The suggestion that the
child might have her own constitutional interest in maintaining a
filial relationship with both her biological father and her mother's
husband, each of whom alternately had lived with and helped to rear
her, was derisively rejected on the same ground.93 This was not the
sort of "family" worthy of "traditional respect in our society" and thus
it lacked "any constitutional significance. '94 Likewise, in Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, the reason why an extended biological family had a
fundamental right to live together, while persons unrelated by "blood,
adoption, or marriage" did not, was that society has demonstrated its
"respect" for the former family arrangement but not for the latter."'

190. Professor Amsterdam made a similar claim with regard to the Fourth Amendment,
though he ultimately rejected an interest-balancing model as too indeterminate.
See
Amsterdam, supra note 187, at 393. For a discussion of the problem of indeterminancy, see infra
Part I.B.2.
191. See infra Part Im.B.2.c.
192. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122-23 & n.3.
193. See id. at 130-31.
194. Id. at 123 n.3.
195. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
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When the boundaries of the fundamental right are marked by the
limits of society's veneration and respect, exclusion from protection
necessarily carries with it the sting of societal condemnation or indifference.
The Court's active winnowing of family groups and decisions
according to the criteria of respect and desert is itself a potent form of
state regulation of family life. By conferring "constitutional significance" ' on favored family groups and decisions while denying it to
others, the Court powerfully expresses state preferences concerning
the construction and conduct of family life. For every paean to the
ancient wisdom of the extended family197 or the simple goodness of the
Amish way of life,9 ' there is a flipside: the mocking derision of a
daughter's relationship with her adulterous father' " or declaration of
the, essential artificiality of the bond between a child and her foster
parents.' There should be no doubting that the expression of these
preferences can exercise a real influence on family life.' Indeed, the
Court itself has acknowledged the particular potency of the
"constitutionalization" of social norms."2 And while it is not surprising

196. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3.
197. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-05.
198. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1972).
199. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123 n.3, 130-31 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
200. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 857, 861-63 (1977) (Stewart,
J., concurring in judgment).
201. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 311-12 (1989) (describing how laws
"influence the way people think and feel about personal commitments," often unintentionally);
REGAN, supra note 125, at 86-88; Bartlett, supra note 125, at 293-95; Gary B. Melton, The
Significance of Law in the Everyday Lives of Children and Families,22 GA. L. REV. 851, 867-77
(1988). Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, for example, has demonstrated how laws relating to
adoption sometimes reinforce stigmatizing stereotypes and shape the identities of adoptive
families.
See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF
PARENTING 48-50, 164-86 (1993). In an earlier article, I have traced the way in which laws
expressing a preference for parents in child custody disputes and subordinating the status of
non-parent caregivers affect the development of child-caregiver bonds. See Meyer, supra note 97,
at 803-12. For other, more general discussions of the expressive significance of law, see
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997);
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996), and Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
202. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the Court struck down on equal-protection
grounds a provision in California's state constitution that guaranteed the right of private
property owners not to sell or lease their property as they saw fit. See id. at 375-76. Though the
provision merely embodied a long-standing rule of the common law, the Court held that the
"constitutionalization" of the principle provided crucial (and therefore impermissible)
"encourage[ment]" to private discrimination. See id. at 376. The "embodi[ment]" of the freedom
to discriminate "in the State's basic charter" made a vital difference, both for the influence of
private behavior and for the Court. Id. at 377.
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that the state should have preferences concerning conduct within the
family, 3 it is odd that the state should go about imposing these
preferences in the course of defining a constitutional guarantee meant
to condemn majoritarian "standardiz[ation]" of family life.'
The Court's expressive regulation of family seems particularly
perverse when it is unintended or comes in cases that nominally vindicate a constitutional claim. Thus, for example, Justice Powell's
tribute to the extended biological family in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland distinguished it from cohabitants who were "unrelated...
by 'blood, adoption, or marriage"' and who thus would not qualify as
families in the sense valued by the Constitution. 5 In doing so, however, the Court provided fodder for later doubting whether a child and
her foster parents could be regarded as "family" for constitutional
purposes. Although the Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform concluded that it could not "dismiss
the foster family as a mere collection of unrelated individuals,"' the
absence of the biological ties and historical veneration the Court had
emphasized in Moore provided the crucial ground for subordinating
foster families to biological ones in a constitutional hierarchy. Children and their foster parents, the Court concluded, were properly
considered a "family-like association[ ]"' and any constitutional privacy interests that "association" might enjoy were "substantially attenuated" when ranked against those of a "natural family."'

203. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20. Professor Schneider, for example, contends
that society, through what he calls the "channelling function in family law," quite properly
encourages its members to make certain choices concerning the construction of their family life.
See generally Carl E. Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
495 (1992).
204. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[M]any cases [have]
prevent[ed] the States from denying important interests or statuses to those whose situations do
not fit the government's narrow view of the family ....[W]e have declined to respect a State's
notion, as manifested in its allocation of privileges and burdens, of what the family should be.')
(citations omitted); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) ("[Ihe
Constitution prevents [the state] from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all
to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns.'); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925) (noting that the Constitution "excludes any general power of the State to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only'); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 783-84 (1989) (arguing that the right of privacy guards
against "a society standardized and normalized, in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly
directed').
205. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498 (distinguishing Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974)).
206. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45 (1977).
207. Id. at 846.
208. Id. at 846-47. The Court ultimately insisted that it was unnecessary to decide whether
foster families have constitutional rights of family privacy because it concluded that the state
had, in any event, provided whatever process was due when it removed foster children from their
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This constitutional sorting of true "families" from mere "quasifamil[ies]"" and "family-like association[s]," echoed enthusiastically in
the statutory and common-law opinions of lower courts,2 1 ° expresses a
public devaluation of non-preferred families."' The expression of this
hierarchy, which may seem so utterly "natural" to those it favors,2"
may inflict a very substantial injury on those it denigrates. 3 Indeed,
to the extent that disfavored families internalize society's valuation, it
may distort dynamics within the family, resulting in a diminished
quality of bonding or the deterrence of potential caregivers from assuming the responsibilities of "quasi"-parenthood in the first place. 1 '
Either outcome frustrates rational public policies toward children and
is particularly maddening because the expressive harm to these families seems a completely gratuitous byproduct of the Court's constitutional protection of "family privacy."
The regulatory effect of the Court's constitutional adjudication
is arguably less troublesome in cases where the Court intends to punish or deter particular family choices. In those instances, such as the

foster parents. See id. at 847. The Court's conclusion on the latter point, however, rested on a
clear hierarchy of family rights: "Whatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster
family as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed
removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural parents." Id. at 846-47.
209. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
210. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979) (describing unmarried
couple who had lived together for 15 years and raised three children as having a "family-like
relationship") (emphasis added); Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 19-20 (Mich. 1999) (holding that
a man who lived with, supported, and cared for children since their birth in mutually mistaken
belief that he was their biological parent is a "third party" without standing to seek visitation or
custody); In re G.C., 735 A.2d 1226, 1229-31 (Pa. 1999) (stating law properly reflects
"subordination" of foster families to biological or adoptive families).
211. See RUBIN, supra note 123, at 155-56. Indeed, Professor Rubin finds in the Supreme
Court's cases across a broad range of constitutional claims an embedded "ideology" favoring and
reinforcing traditional patterns and constructions of family life. See id. at 8-9, 11-20, 143-61,
183-99; see also Martha A. Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the NaturalFamily, 23 CONN. L. REV.
955, 962-66 (1991).
212. See RUBIN, supra note 123, at 190 ('The most likely source of the image of family life
depicted in the [Supreme Court's constitutional] opinions is the personal family experience of the
Justices themselves, the stable, conservative, middle-class family life of the country during the
times of their own childhood."); see also id. at 20-21.
213. Professor Glendon has observed, for example, that "the desire of many persons involved
in nontraditional living arrangements to win approval or at least legitimacy for these
arrangements[]" is a powerful force driving many of the recent controversies over family
regulation. GLENDON, supra note 125, at 125; see also Maya Grosz, To Have and To Hold.
Propertyand State Regulationof Sexuality and Marriage,24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 235,
245 (1998) ('The definition of the family as heterosexual is central to the de-legitimation of gay
and lesbian identity."); cases cited supra note 119.
214. See Meyer, supranote 97, at 810-12 (contending that the law's expressive devaluation of
non-parent caregivers affects the dynamics of bonding within such families and may deter
potential caregivers from becoming guardians).
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Court's revilement of homosexual relations in Bowers or Justice
Scalia's excoriation of adultery in Michael H., the Court's condemnation is likely to be only part of a larger, deliberate regime of
regulation to which the state is firmly committed. 15 The Court's
piling-on may add relatively little to the overall degree of the state's
intrusion.
Even in those cases, however, the Court's interjection in the
name of family privacy may entrench more intrusive forms of state
regulation. Thirty-five years ago, Professor Alexander Bickel pointed
out that the Court's act of upholding the constitutionality of a controversial measure can lend it new legitimacy, altering the political
debate over its merits and sustaining it past the time when it would
have been discarded had the Court not intervened."6 My point here is
related, but more refined: not only the act of upholding, but also the
manner of the Court's upholding, may affect the future course of state
regulation. The morality of homosexual relationships, for example, is
now the topic of much debate,"' and traditional consensus over the
propriety of state sanctions directed at homosexuals is breaking
down. '8 The political process, left to its own devices, seems clearly to
be moving in the direction of less intrusive regulation of gay and
lesbian couples and the families they head."9 The Court's current

215. See Richard A. Posner, Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If So, Who Should
Decide?, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1583 (1997) (book review).
216. As Professor Bickel observed:
To declare that a statute is not [constitutionally] intolerable because it is not inconsistent
with principle amounts to a significant intervention in the political process, different in
degree only from a declaration of unconstitutionality. It is no small matter... to
'legitimate" a legislative measure. The Court's prestige, the spell it casts as a symbol,
enable it to entrench and solidify measures that may have been tentative in conception or
that are on the verge of abandonment in the execution. The Court, regardless of what it
intends, can generate consent and may impart permanence.
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword"The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 48 (1961).
217. See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997) (setting
forth various views from different sides of the debate over same-sex marriage); Ball, supra note
119.
218. The Court's conclusion in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), that it is not a
legitimate end of government to exhibit "animosity" toward homosexuals--coming one decade
after Bowers sustained anti-sodomy laws based on "the presumed belief of a majority of the
electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable," Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)-reflects just how rapid that breakdown has been, see
Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
219. The recent removal of traditional barriers against adoption by lesbians and gay men is
one illustration of the trend. See Karla J. Starr, Note, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at
Differing State Court Opinions, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1497, 1508-13 (1998); Lois R. Shea, Measure
Would Lift Restrictions on Adoption, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1999, at N.H. Weekly 1, available
in 1999 WL 6043347. Decisions in many states limiting the use of a parent's sexual orientation
as a ground for denying child custody are another. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball & Janice Farrell Pea,
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method of analyzing family-privacy claims, however, risks throwing
the weight of the Constitution behind more heavy-handed regulation.
For, under the Court's current approach, a victory for the government
is very likely to rest not on a declaration that the state, because of
legitimate and important interests, is permitted a certain intrusion
upon the valued privacy interests of gay and lesbian families, but
rather on a declaration that the subjects of the state's regulation have
The
no specially valued "family" interests in the first instance.'
threshold
at
the
claims
Court's preference for deciding family-privacy
definition of the right, rather than in an outright balancing of state
and private interests, inevitably leads to the recognition of a more
rigid constitutional hierarchy of families and family choices. The
Court's pronouncement of such a hierarchy carries a heightened
potential for solidifying intrusive regulation by discounting the very
"family" status of certain claimants and legitimizing the "us-them"
assumptions that underlie many traditional family proscriptions. The
Court rightly has been sensitive to the way in which judicial recognition of a fundamental right can cut short productive debate by placing
some controversy off-limits to the political process."l Yet the Court
largely has ignored the ways in which its method of rejecting fundamental-rights claims can interfere in that same debate, in some cases
perhaps giving second life to controversial regulations that otherwise
would have withered away.
If the Court were openly to embrace an intermediate-scrutiny
approach, however, some of the more pernicious fallout of the Court's
current approach could be avoided. By making it possible for the
Court to sustain government regulation without having to deny at the
threshold that the state's action burdens a private interest of special
constitutional value, an intermediate-scrutiny approach would remove
much of the current pressure on the Court to construe family privacy
rights narrowly. The result would be that the Court could recognize a
broader array of families and family activities as fundamentally worthy of respect, placing in each case a burden on the government to
justify its intrusion on intimate family arrangements and choices.
This would not mean, of course, that this larger array would neces-

Warring with Wardle: Morality, Social Science, and Gay and Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L.
REV. 253.
220. See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (holding that state ban on samesex marriages implicates no fundamental rights because same-sex couples are simply
"incapab[le] of entering into a marriage as that term is defined"); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (same), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
221. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
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sarily escape government regulation; it would mean only that each
regulation would be sustained frankly on its own merits and not on
the basis of a judicial determination that the regulated persons did not
count as "family" in any sense "deserving of constitutional
recognition."'

iI. TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION'S
PROTECTION OF FAMILY PRiVACY
I have argued that, despite the Court's occasionally grandiose
rhetoric about "the sanctity of the family"' and an inviolable "private
realm of family life,"' the Court actually has demonstrated considerable pragmatism in its mediation between state and individual interests with regard to the family.' I also have argued that the Court's
reluctance to come clean about the more temperate nature of its
review has had a paradoxical impact on the family. The Court's nominal retention of the traditional strict-scrutiny framework for protecting fundamental rights has resulted in a narrowing of the sorts of
families and family choices specially protected by the ConstitutionY6
And the Court's habit of explaining its line-drawing in terms of veneration and desert has expressed a hierarchy that itself has regulatory
significance. ' In this section, I offer an alternative approach, bottomed on the sort of "reasonable" accommodation of privacy interests
expressly contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. By evaluating the
"reasonableness" of state incursions under a more flexible standard
approximating intermediate scrutiny, the Court could afford to recognize a broader range of family-privacy interests while still leaving
adequate room for state regulation.
A. The FourthAmendment as Prologue
In seeking to define the balance struck by the Constitution
between communal and individual interests in the "private realm of
family life,"' some reference is plainly appropriate to the "zones of

222. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
223. Id. at 503.
224. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977); Moore, 431 U.S. at
499; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
225. See supra Part I.
226. See supra Part fl.B.1.
227. See supra Part fl.B.2.
228. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
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privacy"" expressly given protection by the Constitution. The right of
family privacy itself, after all, was said to have "emanat[ed]" in part
from the Constitution's express protection of personal privacy against
governmental invasion and search." ° Yet the most substantial of those
textual privacy protections, the Fourth Amendment's restraint on
search and seizure," imposes only a requirement of reasonableness
upon government intrusions into personal privacy. 2 By prohibiting
only "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the text squarely contemplates a balancing of communal interests in law enforcement and
security against personal privacy interests. The amendment's accommodationist approach to privacy protection seems somewhat jarring
compared to the absolutist privacy rhetoric of substantive due process.
Yet the protection of family privacy ultimately would be enhanced, not
compromised, by importing the Fourth Amendment's frank acknowledgment that individual privacy rights are necessarily qualified.
It might seem absurd to hold up the Court's Fourth Amendas a model for other areas of constitutional prijurisprudence
ment
vacy law. Most think it is the Fourth Amendment case law that could
desperately use some modeling.2a The Court's search-and-seizure

229. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
230. See id.
231. The Court in Griswold found evidence of the framers' concern for privacy in "[tihe right
of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment," the Third Amendment's
prohibition against the peacetime quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's protection
against search and seizure, and the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. Id. at 484. Of
those, the "penumbra[l]" associational right of the First Amendment scarcely qualifies as textual,
the Third Amendment has only the most limited application, and the Fifth Amendments
guarantee against self-incrimination seems not so much concerned with keeping information
private-since it freely permits the compelled disclosure of information through non-expressive
means or from sources other than the defendant-as with the particular manner of disclosure.
See David Dolinko, Is There a Rationalefor the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?,33 UCLA
L. REV. 1063, 1108-17 (1986). That leaves the Fourth Amendment as the most substantial
textual protection of personal privacy, a point recognized implicitly in Justice Brandeis' famous
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (locating
in the Fourth Amendment "the right to be let alone").
232. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
233. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment First Principles,107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
757-58 (1994) (describing the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as "an embarrassment[,]
...a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and contradictory, but
often perverse"); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
ConstitutionalTheory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 21-22 (1988) (characterizing "search and seizure law as a
diseased limb on the body of constitutional theory). These complaints, moreover, are by no
means new. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supranote 187, at 349 ("For clarity and consistency, the law
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cases have been widely pilloried for careening between seemingly
guideless balancing and excessive, almost technocratic formalism.'
And, as with the family-privacy cases, the rigidity of the Court's formalistic approach sometimes has pushed it to manipulate the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment privacy right in order to leave tolerable
leeway for law enforcement."' The Court's recent hair-splitting over
what constitutes a "reasonable expectation of privacy" illustrates the
point.'
But for all these jurisprudential shortcomings and qualifications, a distinctive principle of the Fourth Amendment is its embodiment of a more outright balancing approach to privacy protection.
Although the Court sometimes has obscured this balancing by adopting rules demarcating certain police practices as "per se unreasonable," 7 "[t]he core of the Fourth Amendment ...is neither a warrant
nor probable cause, but reasonableness. '' "s And, for all its unevenness,

of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's most successful product.'); Roger B.
Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudicationand the FourthAmendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND.
L.J. 329, 329 (1973) ("The fourth amendment cases are a mess!'); Wayne A. LaFave, Search and
Seizure: 'The Courseof True Law... Has Not ...Run Smooth", 1966 U. ILL. L. REV. 255.
234. See, e.g., Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 233, at 12-20; Ronald F. Wright, Note,
The Civil and CriminalMethodologiesof the FourthAmendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1127 (1984).
235. Professor Yale Kamisar has made a similar point, contending that the perceived rigidity
and high cost of the usual Fourth Amendment remedy, the exclusion of evidence, has pushed the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts to "shrink" the scope of the Amendment's application. See Yale
Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465, 499
(1999) ("One reason [the Court may not abandon the exclusionary rule altogether] is that a
'shrunken' Fourth Amendment and a narrower exclusionary rule has made the rule a good deal
more livable and defensible.'); see also Amsterdam, supra note 187, at 388-90; Phyllis T.
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitatingthe Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 473, 495 (1991); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking FourthAmendment, 21
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 271 (1984) ("Mhese formulas are now little more than readily
manipulable cant; a 'justifiable,' 'reasonable,' or ...'legitimate,' expectation of privacy is simply
one which a majority of the Court wants to accord fourth amendment protection).
236. Compare, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99-101 (1990) (overnight guest has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in host's home, thus triggering Fourth Amendment protection),
with Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998) (daytime guest visiting home to conduct a
commercial transaction lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in hoses home); For a
discussion on the implications of Olsen and Carter, see Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178,
182 (D.C. 1999) (attempting to "read the 'tea leaves" after Olson and Carterand concluding that
a daytime social guest with a longtime relationship with the host would have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in host's home).
237. E.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) ("Time and again, this Court has
observed that searches and seizures 'conducted 'outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions."') (quoting Thompson v.
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984), in turn quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967)).
238. Amar, supra note 233, at 801; accord Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism:
Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1445 (1987) ('The fourth amendment

574

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:527

it remains true that the Court is much more likely in the Fourth
Amendment context to rest its decisions frankly on a case-by-case
assessment of the competing personal and public interests. 39 Indeed,
the Court seems to be moving ever more clearly in this direction.240
Of course, a sort of interest-balancing applies in strict scrutiny,
which asks whether the state's fine-tuned pursuit of a compelling
interest outweighs the individual's specially valued interest in privacy, freedom from racial prejudice, or the like. 1 But, in contrast to
strict scrutiny, which tips the scales heavily in favor of the individual's
interests at the outset, Fourth Amendment balancing is considerably
more flexible. Instead of presupposing that the personal privacy interest is in all cases fixed at a very high level, so that any state intrusion
must be justified by proof of the most extraordinary public interest,
Fourth Amendment balancing permits courts to recognize a lesspowerful public interest as sufficient where the particular personal
privacy interest is less profound. 2 This approach likewise rejects any

forbids only unreasonable searches, and 'objective reasonableness' has been the touchstone of
fourth amendment jurisprudence from the beginning.").
239. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 76466 (1985); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1045-52 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 233,
at 44-50; Wright, supra note 234, at 1131, 1134 (noting that "[t]he balancing approach has
become a fixture in the civil applications of the Fourth Amendment" and is attaining greater
prominence in criminal applications as well).
240. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting
the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174-76
(1988) (noting several objections to the Courts balancing approach); Scott E. Sundby,
"Everyman'sFourthAmendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1766 (1994) ("[Mhe Court [now] has made clear that the bottom-line
Fourth Amendment test is whether the government intrusion is 'reasonable' based upon a
balancing of the government's need to engage in the intrusion against the individual's privacy
interests.") (footnote omitted); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General
ReasonablenessInterpretationof the FourthAmendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 129 (1989)
('The Court's turn away from the specific commands of the warrant clause and toward a
balancing test of general reasonableness is now evident.").
241. See Doff, supra note 81, at 1200 n.95 (noting that strict scrutiny is a form of balancing
where a rigorous burden of proof is placed on the government); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling
GovernmentalInterests and ConstitutionalDiscourse, 55 ALB. L. REV. 549, 551 (1992).
242. The plain-view doctrine's qualification of the warrant requirement is an example. The
Court has held that the warrantless seizure of contraband in plain view of police officers is
reasonable because "resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances would often be
impracticable and would do little to promote the objectives of the Fourth Amendment."
Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375.
Professor Wasserstrom has identified in the Court's fourth amendment cases two distinct
sorts of balancing:
In Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)], the Court adopted what might be called a
"categorical," as opposed to an ad hoc, balancing test: under Terry and its progeny, lesser
fourth amendment intrusions-stops and frisks-require a fixed, albeit reduced,
quantum of evidence-reasonable suspicion. In Winston v. Lee, [470 U.S. 753 (1985),]
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fixed "tailoring" requirement, choosing instead to assess the reasonableness of the government's choice of means in light of the gravity of
its intrusion.43 It is this superior flexibility of Fourth Amendment
balancing which remains a useful analogue for the Court's approach to
family privacy." '
B. A Structured Standardof 'Reasonableness"
Although many of the Court's family-privacy decisions seem to
be based on the same sort of sliding-scale approach evident in its
Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has been more reluctant to conduct its family-privacy balancing out in the open."4 Bringing that
balancing above board, however, would make the Court's family-privacy jurisprudence both more comprehensible and more coherent,
without introducing significant new indeterminacy.
1. The Fruits of Candor
Fully and openly embracing an intermediate-scrutiny standard
in the context of family privacy would remove much of the pressure
that currently distorts the Court's reasoning. Under such a standard,

however, the Court endorsed an open-ended, "case by case," balancing test for surgical
intrusions.
Wasserstrom, supranote 240, at 142-43 (footnote omitted).
243. In upholding an investigative stop in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989), for
example, the Court wrote that "[t]he reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect
does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques." Cf. Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (opinion of White, J.) ("[Tihe investigative methods employed should be
the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short
period of time.') (emphasis added); see also Strossen, supra note 240, at 1205-07 (advocating use
of a least-intrusive-alternative test but acknowledging that the Court has not done so).
244. I acknowledge, of course, that the Fourth Amendment and substantive due process are
often said to be concerned with different sorts of "privacy" interests-the Fourth Amendment
with personal interests in secrecy or seclusion and substantive due process with personal
interests in autonomy. See, e.g., Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner,
C.J.); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP.
CT. REV. 173, 178-88, 192-99. The Fourth Amendment remains a useful analogue for dueprocess protection, however, both because it is quite doubtful that the Constitution assigns less
value to the Fourth-Amendment privacy interests, cf. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that freedom from invasive police searches was highly
valued by the "fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment"), and because, in any
event, both sorts of privacy ultimately share a common underlying concern with safeguarding the
dignity of the individual against state incursion, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48182 (1965); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Michael J. Meyer,
Introduction, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 1, 1-3
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for
Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 645, 661-66 (1985).
245. See supra Part I.
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if state action more than incidentally burdened an intimate and
significant aspect of family life, the state would bear the burden of
demonstrating that the action substantially advanced an important
public objective. 46 In contrast to strict scrutiny, an initial determination that the state was intruding upon the constitutionally protected "private realm of family life" would not necessarily signal defeat
for the government. The real work of drawing the limits on the state's
regulatory power over the family would be shifted from the threshold
definition of the right to the subsequent balancing of state and private
interests. Here, the essence of the judicial inquiry would be whether
the particular benefits to the public of the intrusion, taking into
account the cost of any alternatives, exceed the particular burden
upon the privacy interests of regulated families.47
By making it possible for the Court to recognize an intimate
decision or relationship as within the protected zone of family life
without having reflexively to strike down its regulation, an intermediate-scrutiny standard would remove much of the current incentive for
crabbed constitutional construction of "family."
A judgment
sustaining a regulation would then be based frankly upon an
assessment of its particular merits rather than upon a malignant
characterization of the regulated family choice as not "deserving of
constitutional recognition."2 4

This change would yield three primary benefits. First, it would
minimize the extent to which the Court itself engages in expressive
regulation of the family.249 Although the Court's interest-balancing

inevitably would express some value judgments about alternative
constructions of family life, the new analysis in most cases would
avoid the ultimate disparagement of declaring that a particular intimate relationship does not even count as "family" in the eyes of society
or the Constitution. Given the profound, even defining significance
that family relationships hold for most people, such a declaration is

246. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 31, § 18.3, at 218-21 (discussing court's use of
intermediate scrutiny).
247. That this is the core of the inquiry seems evident both from the equal-protection cases in
which the Court has expressly applied an intermediate-scrutiny standard, see, e.g., United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555-56 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), and from those
in which the Court has applied a similar test sub rosa, see, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230
(1982) (denial of public schooling to undocumented alien children violated Equal Protection
Clause because state failed to show that exclusion sufficiently served "some substantial state
interest").
248. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
249. See supraPart II.B.2.
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particularly potent, and its avoidance would be a worthy benefit in its
own right.'n
Second, refraining the analysis would likely make the boundaries of the family-privacy right not only more generous, but also more
predictable. Lines would still be drawn, of course. At some point of
attenuation, all of us would agree that a particular relationship or
personal decision subject to regulation bears so little relation to the
values underlying the family-privacy right that it warrants no heightened constitutional protection. But our decisions about where to draw
that line would not be distorted by an under-the-table judgment about
the ultimate desirability of the particular governmental action being
challenged. This would leave unresolved the larger, ongoing debate
over how to identify and cabin non-textual constitutional rights, but it
would remove a key pressure point that tends to corrupt and confuse
that debate.
Finally, reorienting the analysis would restore a greater measure of integrity to the Court's family-privacy jurisprudence. The sense
that unspoken policy judgments now often drive the Court's proclamations concerning the scope of family privacy rights can only corrode
public confidence in the Court's work."1 In contrast, "[o]pen balancing
compels a judge to take full responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized, rational account of how he arrives at them. " "
The particular benefit here is not solely the avoidance of cynicism
generated by the Court's current approach. Rather, as Professors
Louis Michael Seidman and Silas Wasserstrom have observed in the
context of the Fourth Amendment, "[b]y candidly addressing the competing interests at stake, the Court encourages dialogue about the
weight to be attached to those interests."' That dialogue serves both

250. See supranote 213 and accompanying text.
251. As Dean Sullivan has observed, "[clandor and demystification are independent goods.
They have instrumental value too: reasons promote trust in the legitimacy of the enterprise and
increase losers' acceptance of defeat." Sullivan, supra note 112, at 309. The Court, of course, has
not been insensitive to concerns about the public perception of its work in this area. See, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867-68 (1992) (expressing concern that appearing to
yield to political pressure to overrule Roe v. Wade would undermine "confidence in the Judiciary"
and the Court's legitimacy).
252. Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the FirstAmendment: Absolutes in the Balance,
50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825 (1962). Professor Amsterdam made the same point in arguing for a
constitutional requirement that police act pursuant to legislative or administrative rules. See
Amsterdam, supra note 187, at 426 ("'Those who make invisible decisions cannot be held
accountable for them.').
253. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 233, at 46 (footnote omitted).
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to keep the courts honest and to expose honest undervaluations of the
competing interests to correction.'
Some might object that shifting from a categorical approach to
a balancing approach would weaken family-privacy rights. This, after
all, has been the basis on which many commentators have assailed the
Court's move toward a "general reasonableness" test for the Fourth
Amendment.'
In the hands of the current Court, a balancing test
might seem a sure tool for shrinking individual rights. For, as Professor John Ely wrote in a slightly different context, "balancing tests
inevitably become intertwined with the ideological predispositions of
those doing the balancing--or if not that, at least with the relative
confidence or paranoia of the age in which they are doing it."'
And
yet, as Dean Kathleen Sullivan has shown cogently, neither balancing
nor more categorical approaches systematically favors expansive
protection of individual rights."7 Categorical approaches, as well as
balancing, are susceptible to ideological manipulation. And where a
categorical approach is being manipulated to constrict the scope of
rights, as seems presently to be the case with the Court's protection of
family privacy, a move to balancing can enlarge the measure of protection. 8
Concededly, moving to a balancing approach, and thereby
frankly acknowledging the qualified nature of family-privacy rights,
risks losing some of the peculiar expressive force that comes from a
more absolute characterization of rights. 9 Professor Charles Black,
for example, once argued that it would be better not to admit that
First Amendment rights sometimes may be overcome, and to do any

254. See generally Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990) (noting that
judges should be "candid" about the reasons for the opinions, but not necessarily "introspective);
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987) (discussing the
extent to which a judge's duty of candor departs from that of a scholar).
255. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 240, at 1194-1200 (exploring the "costs" of "[i]naccurate
identification of competing interests); Sundby, supra note 240, at 1752-54 (introducing the
debate over the reasonableness standard); Wasserstrom, supranote 240, at 121-30.
256. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975).
257. See Sullivan, supra note 112, at 306-09, 317. Indeed, as Professor Wasserstrom has
observed in the context of the Fourth Amendment, in some cases the Rehnquist Court already
has "utilized a test of general reasonableness to strengthen Fourth Amendment protections when
it struck down as unreasonable searches or seizures that satisfied the demands of the warrant
clause." Wasserstrom, supranote 240, at 130.
258. See Sullivan, supra note 112, at 307 (listing several examples where balancing can
"constrain the government and favor rights); see also Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing,
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319, 319-23 (1992) (agreeing with the arguments made by Dean Sullivan).
259. See Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MCH. L. REV. 165, 175-77 (1985)
(using the Constitution's "simple" and "authoritative" style to show how much more powerful it is
than if it were substituted by the language used by courts in interpreting it).
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unavoidable balancing under the table, lest the admission encourage
greater intrusions.' Yet an essential predicate to Black's argument
was that First Amendment rights are so rarely overcome that the
claim of absoluteness could be plausible."1 In the context of family
privacy, in which the courts regularly sustain wide-ranging regulation
of family life, that predicate is missing. 62 Thus, any lost expressive
value of exaggerated rights rhetoric seems likely to be outweighed by
the benefits of a doctrine based on reality, and is offset in any event by
the expressive value gained by offering some protection to realms of
family life now disregarded under the rigidity of the current, more
absolutist approach.
2. The Determinants of Reason
The most pressing objection usually offered against interest
balancing in constitutional law is its indeterminacy.'
As Professor
Schneider put it, "[s]ince personal rights and state interests are incommensurable, it is hard to see what principle would guide courts if
balancing were substituted for two-tier [fundamental-rights]
analysis ....
[And] [s]ince commentators have not proffered a
principle, one wonders how much of an improvement it might be."'
My answer is two-fold.

260. Black warned that "explicit judicial recognition that the right needs to be balanced on
occasion against competing considerations could lead down the slippery slope to its erosion."
GLENDON, supra note 125, at 42 (citing Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme
Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S MAG., Feb. 1961, at 63, 68). Indeed, Black "went so far as
to imply that it is better for the courts to perform any necessary balancing in a covert manner by
manipulating the definition of speech." Id.
261. See id. at 191 n.78.
262. Moreover, as Professor Glendon points out,
[t]he unexpressed premises of this argument-that Americans cannot be trusted to
respect a right that is subject to reasonable limitations, and that they can be deceived by
judicial finagling in the service of the illusion of absoluteness-are hard to reconcile with
democratic values. It is both paternalistic and elitist to suppose that important rights
are safer when judges and scholars pretend they are absolute, than when they stress how
very substantial must be the reasons that must be given for limiting them.
Id. at 42 (footnote omitted).
263. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 972-77 (1987); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179-80 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992).
264. Schneider, supra note 64, at 88-89. Professor Amsterdam objected to open-ended
interest balancing under the Fourth Amendment for the same reason: 'The problem with the
graduated model (of Fourth-Amendment reasonableness], of course, is [that] it converts the
fourth amendment into one immense Rorschach blot." Amsterdam, supra note 187, at 393; see
also id. at 415 (bristling at "the monstrous abyss of a graduated fourth amendment .... splendid
in its flexibility, awful in its unintelligibility, unadministrability, unenforcibility and general
ooziness').
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First, a shift to interest-balancing would constitute a real improvement even if it yielded no greater determinacy in family-privacy
adjudication. The Court's current approach is already markedly
indeterminate because its decisions often rest on interest balancing
that is conducted under the table and then expressed in some other
form in the Court's opinion.2' Therefore, even if the balancing were no
more principled, bringing it above board would have value in itself by
exposing the Court's judgments to greater scrutiny.
Second, the Court's interest balancing need not be guideless in
any event. Indeed, several determinants of the "reasonableness"
judgment already can be teased out of the Court's cases to provide
tolerable determinacy. In the past, the Court has placed varying degrees of emphasis upon factors relating to the unified or fragmented
structure of the regulated family, 2 the particular degree of governmental intrusion,' and historical consensus concerning the value of
This cannot, of course, constitute a
particular privacy interests.'
complete catalogue of relevant considerations. And, to date, the Court
has taken account of these variables only sporadically, inconsistently,
and often indirectly. But, by focusing attention more directly and
openly on these and other factors in subsequent cases, the Court will
initiate a "dialogue" about the proper balance to be struck." Especially over time, the transparency of this approach is likely to produce
a more principled and predictable balancing of interests than the
Court now conducts.
a. Fractureor Unity within the Family.
The first variable which should guide the Court's "reasonableness" inquiry is one which the Court for the most part has addressed
only indirectly. The state's power to intrude upon family life should be
more narrowly confined when the state seeks to assert its values upon
a family that is unified in its resistance. At the opposite pole,
constitutional restraints should be weaker when the family entity is
broken open by internal discord and one family member invites
governmental intervention to resolve an internal dispute. There is no
doubting, of course, that much of traditional family law reflects
265. See supra Parts I.B & I.C. Professor Schneider himself has acknowledged the Court's
tendency to make "sub rosa adjustments of its standards" in this context. See Schneider, supra
note 64, at 88.
266. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
267. See infra Part III.B.2.b.
268. See infra Part III.B.2.c.
269. See supranote 253 and accompanying text.
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similar assumptions. Never-married or divorced parents are subjected
to state investigation and direction on a scale that would be
considered unthinkable in the context of married parents in an intact
family.2Y There are, to be sure, ample grounds for questioning aspects
of this disparity.2 ' But there are also solid reasons for considering the
intact or fractured nature of the affected family as potentially relevant
to the permissible scope of the government's regulatory power.
It bears remembering that the first cases recognizing what
later came to be known as the constitutional right of family privacy
involved state intrusions upon intact and unified families. In Meyer v.
Nebraska7 . and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' the state sought to prevent parents from providing certain forms of instruction to their children. As far as appeared from the record, parents and children stood
united in their opposition to the state's meddling. Moreover, the
state's purpose in intervening was not directly to protect the interests
of the children, but rather to advance the state's own interests by
effectuating the cultural assimilation of immigrant children, thwarting what was perceived to be dangerous balkanization and ensuring
that the children "bec[ame] citizens of the most useful type." 4
The Court's early procreative-liberty cases were of the same
character. Skinner v. Oklahoma,"' for example, involved the govern-

270. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting
Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1545-46 (1998); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Rational DecisionmakingAbout Marriageand Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 27 (1990).
271. Professor Martha Fineman and some other feminist scholars, for example, have
contended that the state's greater willingness to intrude upon families that do not conform to the
traditional, male-dominated, nuclear model reflects deep-seated sexism. See, e.g., MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Fineman, supra note 211, at 958-65; Martha L.A. Fineman,
Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995);
Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495 (1997) (book
review). Others have found in the state's greater intrusions into poor or single-parent families
evidence of class, ethnic, or racial bias. See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 123, at 146-48; Dorothy E.
Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1440-41 (1991); Jane Rutherford, Beyond IndividualPrivacy:A
New Theory of FamilyRights, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 627, 638-39 (1987); cf. Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 833-35 (1977) (noting that "foster care has been condemned as a
class-based intrusion into the family life of the poor").
272. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
273. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
274. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. For an excellent discussion of the political background of the
"Americanization" laws challenged in Meyer and Pierce, see Woodhouse, supra note 35, at 100917. Interestingly, similar concerns are surfacing today in Europe, where some civic leaders have
advocated the suppression of ethnic regional languages as essential to the preservation of a
national democracy. See Marlise Simons, In New Europe, a Lingual Hodgepodge, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1999, at 4 (quoting Maurice Druon, head of the French Academy, as warning that
"[t]eaching regional languages is 'an enterprise that can destroy the unity of the nation"').
275. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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ment's attempt to prevent procreation by a presumably willing couple
in order to further its own interest in eugenics, and Griswold v.
Connecticut76 involved a state's invasion of "the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms" to deny their choice of contraception. In such settings, it seems appropriate to ratchet up the state's burden of justification because the intrusion on decisional privacy seems more palpable:
the family together has made some choice of profound personal importance-concerning whether to have children, say, or how to raise
them-and the state has intervened to deny that choice for
independent purposes of its own.
But the family-privacy right more recently has found application in other settings that often seem less compelling. During the
1970s, the Supreme Court clearly seemed to shift the locus of the
family-privacy right from the family as an entity to individual members within the family. 7 Whereas the Court in previous cases had
grounded the constitutional liberty at stake squarely in the family as
a whole, now the Court recognized the liberty as residing with the
individuals who comprised a family. The procreative liberty that the
Griswold Court had described as inherent in the marital union was
transformed in Eisenstadt v. Baird into "the right of the individual,
27
married or single.""
The mutual rights of parents and children to
companionship and nurture set out in Meyer and Pierce had, by 1979,
become the right of an unwed father to block the adoption of his child
by the mother's new husband. 9 Specifically, the courts have begun to
recognize-though more often implicitly than explicitly-that the
state should have somewhat greater regulatory power in cases where
the family is broken apart by internal conflict or where there is good
reason for suspecting that the family, though intact, is internally
divided.
(i) Broken Families. The right of "family privacy" that seemed
so intuitive in Meyer and Pierce as a shield against unwanted public
intrusion is now often wielded as a sword by individual family members seeking the state's assistance in resolving an internal family
dispute. Non-custodial parents, for example, invoke the Constitution
in demanding court-enforced visitation with estranged children" or in

276. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
277. See GLENDON, supranote 125, at 56-57, 123; Rutherford, supranote 271, at 635-38.
278. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). See generallyJanet L. Dolgin, The Family
in Transition:From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994).
279. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). For a fuller discussion of the evolution
of the Supreme Court's cases defining the constitutional rights of unwed fathers, see generally
Meyer, supranote 97.
280. See supranote 4 and accompanying text
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seeking to win custody from family members with whom they earlier
entrusted their children." With somewhat less success, the Constitution similarly has been invoked by foster parents or children seeking
to foil parents' efforts to oust them from a settled custodial
placement.'
In these cases, the pre-existing fracture within the family justifies allowing the government somewhat wider leeway in its intervention for at least two reasons. First, the privacy interests at stake are
surely less powerful where family members are themselves at an
impasse over a disputed family decision. It is one thing for the government, as in Meyer and Pierce, to override a family's exercise of its
decisional privacy after family members have themselves settled, by
consensus or acquiescence, upon some choice; it is surely something
less for the government to step in when family members themselves
are deadlocked over how to make the choice. Moreover, when family
members are already divided, there is greater potential for conflicting
constitutional claims." In that case, no one outcome seems clearly to
favor the values of "family privacy" and so the government might
reasonably be permitted somewhat greater discretion to choose among
the competing privacy claimants.
Second, a key assumption undergirding the Constitution's protection of family privacy-that, left to their own devices, family members generally can be trusted to act in one another's best interests -is more doubtful in the context of divided and embattled families. A
common justification for limiting governmental power to override
parents' child-rearing decisions, for example, is that parents in most
cases are better situated and better motivated to discern and pursue
their child's interests than is any governmental agent."
When a
281. See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977) (declining
to resolve whether foster parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
maintaining a relationship with their foster children); In re Guardianship of Zachary H., 86 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 7, 16-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a child had a fundamental constitutional
liberty interest in remaining in the custody of non-parent caregivers and that interest prevailed
over father's constitutional interest in obtaining custody); Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780,
790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (Harris, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (stating that
a child has "no right to change parents simply because the child finds substitutes that he or she
likes better").
283. The Court encountered this scenario, for example, in Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), where it found that parents and foster
parents had conflicting constitutional claims to custody of a child. See id. at 846-47.
284. See REGAN, supranote 125, at 11.
285. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601-02 (1979) (asserting that society long has
recognized that "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children'); Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, ParentalRights and the Ugly Duckling, 1 J. L. &
FAM. STUD. 41, 54-55 (1999); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children:A ParentalistManifesto,
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family is torn apart by divorce or other conflict, however, there is
much less reason to be sanguine that family members will look out for
each other better than a neutral outsider. As Professor Elizabeth
Scott and Dean Robert Scott have observed,
For some non-custodial parents, the crescive bond of parenthood grows more
attenuated [after separation], such that being the child's parent becomes less central to
personal identity. As the unity of parents' and children's interests dissolves, the risk of
conflicts intensifies. Moreover, for many non-custodial parents, the rewards of parenthood diminish after2 divorce, reducing further the incentive to invest in the relationship
with their children.'

Courts have recognized this reality in explaining, for example,
why it is constitutional for a state to require divorced or never-married parents to pay for a child's college education, while not extending
the same requirement to married parents.2 87 The same recognition
underlies much of the law providing for child-visitation rights by
grandparents and other extended family members. The common
restriction of court authority over visitation disputes to those occurring in non-intact families in part reflects a judgment that parents in
intact families can generally be trusted to grant access to their children in a responsible manner."

63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 940, 951-60 (1996); McCarthy, supra note 89, at 1017-19; Schneider,
Rights Discourse, supra note 125, at 159; Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as
Fiduciaries,81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2431-37, 2443-44 (1995).
286. Scott & Scott, supra note 285, at 2446-47 (footnotes omitted). Many non-custodial
parents, typically fathers, report that conflict or frustration with the constraints of visitation
lead them ultimately to withdraw from contact with or support of their children. See id. at 244647 nn.135-36 (collecting studies).
287. See, e.g., McFarland v. McFarland, 885 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Ark. 1994); Kujawinski v.
1978) ("Unfortunately, it is not the isolated exception
Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1389-90 (Ill.
that noncustodial divorced parents, because of... additional expenses [incident to their divorce]
or because of a loss of concern for children who are no longer in their immediate care and
custody, or out of animosity directed at the custodial spouse, cannot be relied upon to voluntarily
support the children of the earlier marriage to the extent they would have had they not
divorced.'); Neudecker v. Neudecker, 566 N.E.2d 557, 563 (Ind.Ct. App.), affd, 577 N.E.2d 960
(Ind.1991); In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1980); LeClair v. LeClair, 624
A.2d 1350, 1356-57 (N.H. 1993); Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 207 (Wash. 1978) (en banc);
cf. In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) (upholding rationality of
distinction on grounds that "'children of an existing marriage derive many benefits that
[children] of a dissolved marriage [are] deprived of sharing ") (quoting Leahy v. Leahy, 858
S.W.2d 221, 230 (Mo. 1993) (en banc). But see Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. 1995)
(sustaining equal protection challenge to statute authorizing post-secondary educational
support); Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1984) (same).
288. See, e.g., B.R.O. v. G.C.O., 646 So. 2d 126, 131 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (court may not
compel parents in an "intact family" to facilitate grandparent visitation); Beagle v. Beagle, 678
So. 2d 1271, 1277 (Fla. 1996) (same); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (same);
Dotson v. Hylton, 513 S.E.2d 901, 903 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (strict scrutiny applies only when the
state orders visitation over the objections of a "unified family"; lesser constitutional scrutiny
applies when only one parent objects); Laurence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Fatherand Thy Mother:
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(ii) Families with Potentially Conflicting Interests. The Court
has also recognized, at least tacitly, that even when a family remains
intact, a high potential for internal conflicts of interest may justify
greater deference to state intervention. The Court has scrutinized
most aggressively state action which appears to be directed against
families with unified interests."9 The Court's zeal has dissipated
markedly, however, when it has detected a significant potential for
conflicting interests within the regulated family. The Court's indignant offense in Meyer and Pierce to state efforts to "standardize"
children, for instance, evaporated in Prince v. Massachusetts' when
the Court considered a guardian's decision to enlist her nine-year-old
niece in her religious evangelism. Finding it "wholly inappropriate" to
expose a child to the "difficult[ies]" of street-corner proselytizing, the
Court plainly believed that the child's interests were in conflict with
her guardian's."
"Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves," the Court concluded, "[b]ut it does not follow they are
free.., to make martyrs of their children before they have reached
the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves."' 2"
The Court followed a similar line of reasoning, though it
arrived at a different result, in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 3 In finding that
Wisconsin could not compel Amish parents to send their children to
public high school, the Court emphasized that it found no real danger
that the interests of the children were at odds with those of their
parents."4 Justice White, moreover, speaking for three Justices in his
concurring opinion, made clear that it would be "a very different case"
if the evidence suggested a substantial conflict of interests. 5 If the
parents had sought to exempt their children from all forms of state-

But Court-OrderedGrandparentsVisitation in the Intact Family?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 51 (1993);
Judith L. Shandling, Note, The ConstitutionalConstraintson Grandparents'Visitation Statutes,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 133-35 (1986) (differentiating between intact and non-intact families).
289. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), for instance, the Court gave no hint that the children might have any interest adverse to
their parents in the choice of schooling;, so, too, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), all family
members seemed to share a common goal that was being thwarted from without by the state.
290. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
291. Id. at 169-70.
292. Id. at 170.
293. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
294. See id. at 230-31; id. at 237 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("As the Court points out, there is
no suggestion whatever in the record that the religious beliefs of the children here concerned
differ in any way from those of their parents.').
295. Id. at 238 (White, J., concurring).
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regulated elementary education, for example, the concurring Justices
suggested that the balance would have swung in favor of the state.'
The Court's detection of significantly conflicting interests
within the family is relevant to its constitutional balancing in two
ways. First, the conflict may bolster the strength of the state's
interest in intervention, such as when the state acts as parens patriae
to protect the interests of children. 7 At the same time, just as in the
case of broken families, the existence of internal conflict may weaken
the privacy interests on the other side of the balance. Disputes over
grandparent visitation provide an illustration. Although state legislatures and courts generally have placed tighter restrictions on court
authority to order grandparent visitation in "intact!' families, "8 there
is reason for regarding the "family privacy" interest as compromised
even when parents are married and united in their desire to cut off
grandparents' access to a child. The Court previously has recognized
that the emotional bonds between members of an extended family can
be profoundly important to the individuals involved.'
Certainly, if

296. Justice White explained that his constitutional analysis would change if the Amish
parents had claimed "that their religion forbade their children from attending any school at any
time and from complying in any way with the educational standards set by the State." Id. In
that event, he explained, the parents' interest in controlling their children's education and
exercising their religious faith would present a more direct conflict with the children's own
interests in "acquir[ing] the basic tools of literacy" and developing the capacity to live
independently. See id. But, since the parents sought an exemption only from sending their
children to high school, Justice White thought the conflict of interests less pressing.
297. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 747, 754
(1996) (Breyer, J., plurality opinion) (stating that the protection of children is a compelling
interest); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that
state has a compelling interest in "the education and training of young people"); Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ('The State, of course, has a duty of the highest order to protect
the interests of minor children, particularly those of tender years.'); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982) (state's "interest-safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor-is a compelling one").
298. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
299. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the plurality spoke glowingly of
the tradition of shared child-rearing within the extended family:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of a
nuclear family .... Even if conditions of modem society have brought about a decline in
extended family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization,
gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports a larger
conception of the family.
Id. at 504-05. Later the same Term, in Smith v. Organizationof FosterFamilies for Equality
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), the Court again recognized that "the importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional
attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association," rather than from its formal legal
or biological classification. Id. at 844; see also In re Whitaker, 522 N.E.2d 563, 567 & n.3 (Ohio
1988) (discussing the profound importance to grandchildren and grandparents of continuing
contact); Erica L. Strawman, Grandparent Visitation: The Best Interests of the Grandparent,
Child, and Society, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 31, 41-44 (1998) (same).
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those bonds were threatened with destruction directly by the state,
rather than by the child's parents, their preservation would be a core
Even
concern of the Constitution's regard for family privacy.'
without formally classifying the interest of grandparents and
grandchildren in preserving their relationship over parental objection
as a countervailing fundamental right, that interest hardly seems
irrelevant in assessing the strength of the parents' asserted interest in
When the state's intervention in the family is
"family privacy."''
intended to mediate between or among what appear to be conflicting
interests of individual family members, the state's action is less
obviously an affront to the values of "family privacy" and should be
regarded with somewhat less suspicion than when the state acts solely
in order to assert some interest independent of the family.
b. The Degree of Governmental Intrusion
A second and related variable in the Court's protection of family privacy is the degree of the government's intrusion upon family
relationships or decisionmaking. The Constitution should be understood to require correspondingly more aggressive judicial scrutiny as
the government intrudes more deeply into the protected realm of
family life. Smaller intrusions-say, mandatory waiting periods or
counseling sessions before marriage, or prohibitions of certain means
of parental discipline-should receive a greater measure of deference
than larger ones-say, categorical prohibitions on entry into marriage
or the outright termination of parental rights.
The Court, to some extent, already acknowledges that the degree of intrusion is relevant to its choice of a standard of review. The
Court, for instance, has differentiated its review of "direct" burdens on
fundamental rights from that of merely "incidental" burdens.' And,
as Professor Michael Dorf has pointed out, the Court's differentiation
turns as much on the substantiality as the directness of the burden.'

300. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504-06.
301. Some state courts have rejected parents' constitutional challenges to court-ordered
visitation by grandparents on essentially this basis. See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632
(Ky. 1992) (upholding a grandparent-visitation statute on the grounds that it "seeks to balance
the fundamental rights of the parents, grandparents and the child" and that the state's effort to
foster "the development of a loving relationship between family members" justified the limited
intrusion upon parents' child-rearing authority), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992).
302. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873-74 (1992); Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978); see also supranote 61 and accompanying text.
303. See Doff, supra note 81, at 1221, 1233-37. Indeed, the Court has said as much with
regard to marriage regulations. Whereas the Court aggressively has struck down laws or
regulations that foreclosed marriage in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386; Turner v. Safley,
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In this sense, it is clear at least that the Court varies the strength of
its review according to a broad threshold categorization of the character of the government's incursion.
Yet, the Court's family-privacy cases have gone still fartheralbeit usually without saying so-in calibrating the strength of review
to the substantiality of the government's invasion.
Even after
deciding at the threshold that a particular burden cannot be
categorized as "incidental," the Court often takes account of the
particular extent of the intrusion in assessing the sufficiency of the
government's asserted interests.
In the context of a parent's
"fundamental liberty interest" in "'the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children,' ...for example, the Court has
distinguished state action that threatened to destroy the parent-child
bond from that which threatened merely to deprive a parent of
custody or to impinge upon a parent's child-rearing preferences. In a
series of cases, the Court has required extra procedural safeguards
when the state seeks to terminate parental rights on the ground that
"[t]he object of the proceeding is 'not simply to infringe upon [the
parent's] interest,'... 'but to end it.' ....
The Court likewise has recognized significant substantive
limitations on the state's power to extinguish the parent-child relationship, while allowing the state considerably more leeway in lesser
interventions."
And, perhaps most explicitly, the Court's "undue
burden" test in the context of abortion requires a direct assessment of

482 U.S. 78 (1987); and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), it deferred easily to regulations
that resulted in a forfeiture of welfare benefits upon marriage, see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977). The difference in scrutiny, the Court explained, turned on "[t]he directness and
substantiality of the [particular] interference with the freedom to marry." Zablocki, 434 U.S. at
387 n.12.
304. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
305. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 118 (1996) (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27). In
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769, the Court held that the Constitution required the state to prove the
statutory grounds for termination of rights by clear-and-convincing evidence; in Lassiter, 452
U.S. at 26-27, the Court held that indigent parents, under some circumstances, must be given
legal counsel; finally, in M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 118, the Court recognized a right of indigent parents
to a waiver of costs usually required for the filing of an appeal.
306. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760 n.10 C"
'We have little doubt that the Due Process
Clause would be offended '[i]f a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family,
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for
the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest.'") (quoting Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) in turn quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
(state may not extinguish established relationship between children and their unwed father by
permitting their adoption by another man without proving grounds for terminating parental
rights).
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the degree of the government's interference with the woman's decisionmaking process."° Indeed, as Professor Schneider observed even
before Casey, "the Court in Roe v. Wade seemed to be using just such a
sliding scale in its scheme of increasing levels of permissible regulation in each succeeding trimester."3 °8
There is an obvious logic to these cases, though it is difficult to
The
square neatly with the traditional strict-scrutiny formula.'
strength of the justification demanded of the government should be
calibrated to match the extent to which the government seeks to intrude upon constitutional values of family privacy.
c. HistoricalConsensus Regarding the Family
Finally, the Court still could take history and tradition into
account in its balancing of the competing state and private interests.
The Court is now firmly committed to the idea that historical consensus regarding the propriety of regulation is relevant to an assessment
of its constitutionality, but has been inconsistent about exactly how
history should be taken into account. Most often, the Court refers to
historical consensus in identifying whether regulated conduct falls
within the scope of a claimed fundamental right. Yet, in other cases
history has taken a back seat to philosophical or other concerns which
impelled the Court to extend substantive-due-process protection to
choices or conduct that had long been the subject of extensive and
often hostile state regulation." '
My point is that even after the Court has decided at the
threshold that regulated conduct qualifies as the exercise of a fundamental right, the historical pedigree of the regulation may be relevant
to the ultimate determination of its constitutionality. The Court itself
sometimes has considered historical consensus in its state-interest
balancing as well as in its threshold definition of fundamental rights.

307. See Casey, 505 U.S. 874, 877 (distinguishing between regulations which "have the
incidental effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability" of abortion and those which
"plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion").
308. Schneider, supra note 64, at 94.
309. See id. at 94-95 ('The language of the [strict-scrutiny] test suggests that [its] terms are
not relative, that an interest is either compelling or it isn't, that a statute is either necessary to
serve an interest or it isn't. Moreover, the Court has never avowedly treated 'compelling' or
'necessary' as relative terms .... .').
310. Abortion and interracial marriage are obvious examples. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 159-60 (1996) (discussing Loving); Walter Dellinger &
Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 83, 91-92 (1989); see also supranotes 177-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
inconsistent reliance on history and tradition in identifying non-textual fundamental rights).
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In both Zablocki v. Redhail" and Moore v. City of East Cleveland," for
instance, the Justices emphasized the novelty of the challenged
regulations as a reason for demanding greater justification from the
state.3 That society has managed for two centuries without resorting
to a given form of regulation should stoke judicial skepticism that the
regulation is needed now.
By the same token, the existence of a long-settled societal consensus that a given regulation is appropriate should counsel caution
in invalidating it. As Professor Schneider has argued, much of family
law is built upon assumptions concerning human nature that are
essentially unprovable, and some greater measure of deference is due
when the legislature regulates according to "a theory of human nature
[which] has been substantially relied on in the past and.., has
substantial intellectual antecedents. 3 . 4 That deference is appropriate
partly because regulations that have stood the political test of time are
at least somewhat more likely to actually advance community
interests.
It is also appropriate because an utter disregard of
traditional consensus in an area of such profound interest to the
community would be perilous for the judiciary.1 5
In no case should the presence or absence of historical precedent be dispositive. The solid historical pedigree of Virginia's antimiscegenation law,16 for example, should in no way mandate a conclu-

311. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
312. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
313. In Zablocki, the Court struck down a law that required parents who were subject to a
Justice Stewart,
prior child-support order to obtain court permission before marrying.
concurring in the judgment, balanced the state's interests in enforcing support obligations and
ensuring the financial stability of marriages against the incursion on personal privacy interests
and concluded that the state's interests fell short primarily because the 'legislative judgment
[was] so alien to our traditions and so offensive to our shared notions of fairness." Zablocki, 434
U.S. at 395. Similarly, in Moore, the Justices emphasized the "unusual," Moore, 431 U.S. at 496
(Powell, J., plurality opinion), and "eccentric way," id. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring), in which
East Cleveland had sought to regulate residential living patterns in explaining why its proffered
justifications were insufficient.
314. Schneider, supranote 64, at 102.
315. As Justice Harlan observed, "[a] decision of th[e] Court which radically departs from
[traditional consensus regarding the appropriate balance between state power and individual
liberty] could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
sound." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
316. As Professor Eskridge has written, "[flew traditions are as pervasive in American legal
history as laws prohibiting different-race marriages." ESKRIDGE, supra note 310, at 154; see also
Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 221, 274-75 (1999). Virginia's anti-miscegenation law dated back to 1691, see ESKRIDGE,
supra note 310, at 154; Grosz, supra note 213, at 239, and as many as thirty-seven other states
enacted similar bans, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 310, at 155. At the time the Supreme Court
reviewed Virginia's statute in Loving v. Virginia, fifteen other states clung to their prohibitions
on interracial marriage. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967).
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sion that the state interests supporting the measure outweighed the
profoundly intrusive burden on individuals like Mildred and Richard
Loving. But historical practices and traditional consensus about the
propriety of a particular intrusion upon the family may well be relevant in adjusting the specific burden of justification demanded of the
government.
3. The Determinants Applied
These (and undoubtedly other) factors could work together to
direct and structure a judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of a
given regulation. In some cases, the factors might point strongly toward a clear answer to the constitutional question. Consider, for example, a law requiring parental consent for minors who wish to
marry."' The law fairly could be understood as an attempt to mediate
between potentially conflicting interests within a family."8 Rather
than the state interjecting itself into a family for independent purposes of its own, the state through such a law would be trying to vindicate one cognizable family-privacy interest-the interests of parents
in making decisions directly affecting the welfare of their minor children-against another-that of children to make their own decisions
concerning marriage. The second factor, concerning the degree of
state intrusion upon privacy interests, similarly would weigh in favor
of a moderated standard of judicial review. Here, the law would not
deny marriage altogether to minors who could not obtain parental
consent; it would require only that they delay marriage until they
reach the age of consent or can otherwise persuade their parents to go
along. Finally, the long historical pedigree of age restrictions on
marriage,"'9 and the continuing societal consensus supporting such
restrictions, likewise would counsel against their invalidation." Each
of these factors, then, would suggest a standard of constitutional
review considerably more deferential than traditionally associated
with fundamental-rights analysis.
A court should sustain the
parental-consent requirement, even if it would not survive the

317. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 205(a), 9A U.L.A. 168 (1987) (requiring
parental or judicial consent to marriage for minors aged 16 or 17 years, and parental and judicial
consent for minors aged 15 years or younger).
318. See supra Part IH.B.2.a.ii.
319. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
2.10, at 88-89 (2d ed. 1988); MICHAEL A. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1985); see also, e.g., Agent v. Willis, 32 S.E. 322 (N.C.
1899) (applying age restriction on marriage).
320. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 392 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in
judgment).

592

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:527

strictures of "compelling interest" review, so long as the public
benefits of the measure seem to outweigh the relatively limited burden
on minors' privacy interests."'
In the opposite direction, consider a case like Loving v.
Virginia.' In that case, the state sought through the challenged statute to foist its values on an intact family that was united in its opposition."n The degree of the state's intended intrusion on the right to
marry was maximal, as the state sought to withhold marriage altogether from interracial couples. And although there was historical
precedent for such prohibitions, 4 the tradition was in full-scale
retreat 5 and any societal consensus on the matter plainly had collapsed. Thus, the first two factors would call for the most aggressive
judicial scrutiny, and the third would not weigh strongly for a moderation of that approach. Thus, the facts of Loving would suggest a standard of judicial review quite nearly approaching strict scrutiny.
This is not to say, of course, that these factors will lead in all
cases to clear answers. When the various factors point more strongly
in opposite directions, some judgment obviously must be made about
how to balance them, and no simple formula can provide an answer.
The question of same-sex marriage provides an obvious illustration.
Here, the first two factors are essentially the same as with the antimiscegenation law in Loving: the state is imposing itself upon an
intact family unified in its resistance and the degree of its intrusion is
great. The third factor, however, is different. The historical precedent
for laws banning same-sex marriage is much stronger than it was for
anti-miscegenation legislation. Whereas the latter laws were mostly

321. The requirement that the government demonstrate the public value of its regulation
distinguishes this approach from the now-prevailing tendency to rule for the government by
narrowly defining the fundamental right. Cf Moe v. Dinkins, 669 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1982)
(defining the fundamental right to marry as not including "the right of minors to marry," and
therefore applying rational-basis review to age-based, parental-consent requirement); Hutchins
v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Rogers, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part) (suggesting the same approach in dictum).
322. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
323. See supra Part III.B.2.a. The state did seek to justify its intervention partly on the
grounds that it was safeguarding the interests of any children who might be born to the
interracial union, see Loving, 388 U.S. at 7, and thus arguably was directing itself toward a
family with potentially conflicting interests, see supra Part III.B.2.a.ii. But the basis of the
state's claimed concern was, at least by the 1960s, so transparently trumped up that it would not
materially alter the analysis.
324. See discussion supranote 316.
325. The number of jurisdictions banning interracial marriage declined from thirty at the
end of the Second World War to sixteen at the time the Court decided Loving in 1967. See
ESKRIDGE, supranote 310, at 157, 159.
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confined to selected geographic areas, ' the barrier to same-sex marriage today remains universal. There is also a difference in the degree
of societal consensus supporting the regulations. Most data today
suggests that a majority of Americans continue to support a ban on
same-sex marriage,"'*whereas public support for anti-miscegenation
laws was clearly collapsing in the 1960s."2
These differences suggest that some moderation of the level of
scrutiny is appropriate, but they do not, of course, specify the precise
extent of the moderation. Merely identifying the most relevant determinants of the reasonableness inquiry still leaves plenty of play in the
joints, and undoubtedly judges would vary in the extent to which they
emphasized any one factor. Ultimately, of course, there is no getting
around that adjudication of substantive due process claims requires
courts to make difficult judgments about the relative weight to be
assigned to competing values." A virtue of acknowledging the qualified nature of family-privacy rights, however, is that it at least would
help to focus the inquiry upon the crux of the relevant disagreementin this case, the extent of deference that is owed to tradition in reviewing a highly burdensome and intrusive regulation of family." °
More important, this approach would place on the state the
burden of offering some real justification beyond bare tradition in
order to sustain the regulation. A state wishing to retain its ban on
same-sex marriages could not simply point out that the ban was of
long standing, shifting to the challengers the burden of proving its
utter irrationality. Rather, the state would now be required to come
forward with evidence to demonstrate that the ban substantially

326. The laws were found mostly in the deep South, the West, and Civil War border states.
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 310, at 157 n.c (listing the thirty states that had such laws at the end
of the Second World War).
327. See Robbennolt & Johnson, supra note 189, at 419 (noting that "[a] 1998 poll revealed
that only 29% of the general public approved of legally sanctioned same-sex marriage"); Ball,
supra note 119, at 1877 nn.21 & 22.
328. See Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal
Narrativeof Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229, 233-34 (1998) (noting that 13 states-nearly
half of those which had such laws-repealed their anti-miscegenation laws between 1952 and
1967).
329. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ('The inescapable fact is
that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the
Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised:
reasoned judgment."); id. at 850 (" 'No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.") (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
330. And, even in the hardest cases, it is doubtful that the analysis would be any less
determinate than the Court's current practice of conducting essentially the same balancing
under the table.
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advanced a public interest of real importance. The imposition of this
requirement itself would constitute a major step forward.33"'
And, even if the courts ultimately upheld the prohibition after
finding that the state's interests outweighed the intrusion on families,
this approach would avoid branding the regulated families as not
"families" at all or otherwise as "[un]deserving of constitutional recog33
nition.""
As Dean Sullivan has observed, affecting the outcomes of
cases is not the only consideration in the choice of a doctrinal method:
"What a Court says about why a law is upheld [also] matters. There is
a value to judicial explanations."'
And the value in this context is
nothing less than acknowledgment of the essential dignity of the full
range of American families.

CONCLUSION

For seventy-five years, the Supreme Court's protection of the
constitutional rights of family privacy has had two sides. On the outside is a veneer of often absolutist rhetoric exalting the "sanctity of the
family"3 and sketching the boundaries of "a 'private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.' ,,i On the inside is an essentially
pragmatic approach to deciding actual controversies involving the
family. In cases involving marriage, procreation, family living arrangements, and parenting, the Court has been pointedly reluctant to
live up to the implications of its lofty rhetoric, and for good reason.
The rigidity of traditional fundamental-rights analysis, with its search
for compelling interests and narrow tailoring, is ill-suited to the task

331. As David A.J. Richards has written:
A constitutional theory and practice, so rooted in skepticism about the abuses of state
power, must extend to contemporary generations the same kind of skepticism, that is, the
closest scrutiny of alleged grounds of "traditional morality" or '"natural differences" of
gender or sexual preference so often used to justify what should be under American
constitutionalism unjustifiable-the appeal to traditional hierarchies of domination and
servility that rest on the unreasoning and unreasonable degradation of the moral powers
of free and equal people.
David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Liberty, Dignity, and Reasonable Justification, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supranote 244, at 73, 99.

332. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
333. Sullivan, supra note 112, at 309. Like Professor Nagel, I believe this is true even
acknowledging that the public's perception of judicial explanation is likely to be both limited and
filtered. See Nagel, supranote 259, at 169-77.
334. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(noting that the Constitution protects "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms).
335. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944));
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977).
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of mediating the complex and intersecting private and communal
interests which are often at stake in the family.
Though the Court has been right to moderate its scrutiny in
the family-privacy context, it has been wrong to resist acknowledging
this reality. The Court's refusal to come clean about the true
character of its role and the qualified nature of family privacy rights
paradoxically has undermined the values of autonomy and intimacy
that the rights are said to exalt. The Court's nominal adherence to the
traditional strict-scrutiny formula has pushed it to construe the scope
of family-privacy rights narrowly at the threshold in order to leave
tolerable leeway for state regulation. And the Court's tendency to
justify its narrow construction in terms of the desert or legitimacy of
particular family relationships or decisions itself has regulatory.
significance, compounding the extent of the state's intrusion into

family life.
Openly embracing the intermediate-scrutiny review that in fact
has characterized much of the Court's work in this context would place
family privacy rights on a less exalted, but ultimately more secure,
plane. The Court's cases already provide criteria that would help
wring some of the indeterminacy out of a straightforward reasonableness inquiry. And the more flexible standard would permit the Court
to comprehend a broader range of family choices and relationships as
worthy of constitutional respect, while sustaining state regulation
upon a true demonstration that its merits outweigh its costs.

